Documentation

Linglib.Theories.Semantics.Attitudes.NegRaising

Neg-Raising as O→E Pragmatic Strengthening #

@cite{gajewski-2007} @cite{horn-2001}

Neg-raising is the phenomenon where the negation of an attitude verb is interpreted as the attitude applied to the negated complement:

"I don't think it's raining" ≈ "I think it's not raining" ¬Bel(p) → Bel(¬p)

In terms of the Square of Opposition, this is strengthening from the O-corner (¬Bel(p)) to the E-corner (Bel(¬p)). This strengthening is available precisely because belief and disbelief are contraries: one can neither believe p nor believe ¬p (the "undecided" gap). The pragmatic inference fills this gap by assuming the agent has a settled opinion.

The Doxastic Square #

        contraries
  Bel(p) ────────── Bel(¬p)
    │ │
    │ │
    │ │
  ◇p ──────────────── ¬Bel(p)
       subcontraries

Neg-raising is available for believe and think (non-veridical: there is a gap between ¬Bel(p) and Bel(¬p)) but NOT for know (veridical: ¬know(p) includes cases where p is false, so strengthening to know(¬p) would require ¬p to be true, which is a factual claim the speaker may not intend).

def Semantics.Attitudes.NegRaising.doxasticSquare {W : Type u_1} {E : Type u_2} (R : Doxastic.AccessRel W E) (agent : E) (worlds : List W) (p : WBool) :

The doxastic square for a belief predicate.

Given an accessibility relation, agent, and proposition, produce the four corners of the doxastic square of opposition:

  • A = Bel(p): all doxastic alternatives satisfy p
  • E = Bel(¬p): all doxastic alternatives satisfy ¬p
  • I = ◇p: some doxastic alternative satisfies p
  • O = ¬Bel(p): not all doxastic alternatives satisfy p
Equations
  • One or more equations did not get rendered due to their size.
Instances For
    theorem Semantics.Attitudes.NegRaising.doxasticSquare_contradAO {W : Type u_1} {E : Type u_2} (R : Doxastic.AccessRel W E) (agent : E) (worlds : List W) (p : WBool) (w : W) :
    (doxasticSquare R agent worlds p).A w = !(doxasticSquare R agent worlds p).O w

    The doxastic square satisfies the A–O contradiction diagonal.

    theorem Semantics.Attitudes.NegRaising.doxasticSquare_contradEI {W : Type u_1} {E : Type u_2} (R : Doxastic.AccessRel W E) (agent : E) (worlds : List W) (p : WBool) (w : W) :
    (doxasticSquare R agent worlds p).E w = !(doxasticSquare R agent worlds p).I w

    The doxastic square satisfies the E–I contradiction diagonal.

    This requires that diaAt is the dual of boxAt: ◇p = ¬□¬p. We prove this from the definitions.

    A neg-raising predicate is a doxastic predicate whose negation is pragmatically strengthened from O (¬Bel(p)) to E (Bel(¬p)).

    The negRaises field indicates whether the predicate supports this inference. Structurally, neg-raising is available when the predicate is non-veridical (belief, not knowledge).

    Instances For
      def Semantics.Attitudes.NegRaising.negRaisesAt {W : Type u_1} {E : Type u_2} (R : Doxastic.AccessRel W E) (agent : E) (worlds : List W) (p : WBool) (w : W) :

      Neg-raising is the pragmatic inference from O to E: ¬V(p) is strengthened to V(¬p).

      This is the "excluded middle of belief": when a speaker says "I don't think p", they implicate they have a settled opinion, namely Bel(¬p).

      Equations
      • One or more equations did not get rendered due to their size.
      Instances For

        Neg-raising is available exactly when the predicate admits a gap between ¬Bel(p) and Bel(¬p) — i.e., when the O→E strengthening is a genuine pragmatic move (not a semantic entailment).

        For non-veridical predicates, ¬Bel(p) does NOT semantically entail Bel(¬p) — there is a gap (the agent might be undecided). Neg-raising fills this gap pragmatically.

        For veridical predicates (know), ¬know(p) could mean either: (a) p is true but agent doesn't know it, or (b) p is false Strengthening to know(¬p) would require (b), which is a factual claim beyond pragmatic strengthening.

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          "believe" supports neg-raising. "I don't believe it's raining" ≈ "I believe it's not raining".

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            "think" supports neg-raising. "I don't think it's raining" ≈ "I think it's not raining".

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              "know" does NOT support neg-raising. "I don't know it's raining" ≠ "I know it's not raining".

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                "believe" is classified as neg-raising.

                "think" is classified as neg-raising.

                "know" is NOT classified as neg-raising.

                theorem Semantics.Attitudes.NegRaising.believe_square_contradictions {W : Type u_1} {E : Type u_2} (R : Doxastic.AccessRel W E) (agent : E) (worlds : List W) (p : WBool) (w : W) :
                (doxasticSquare R agent worlds p).A w = !(doxasticSquare R agent worlds p).O w (doxasticSquare R agent worlds p).E w = !(doxasticSquare R agent worlds p).I w

                The doxastic square for "believe" satisfies the contradiction diagonals.