Doxastic accessibility relation type.
R(agent, evalWorld, accessibleWorld) = true iff accessibleWorld is compatible with what agent believes/knows in evalWorld.
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Universal modal: true at w iff p true at all accessible worlds.
⟦□p⟧(w) = ∀w'. R(w,w') → p(w')
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- Semantics.Attitudes.Doxastic.boxAt R agent w worlds p = worlds.all fun (w' : W) => !R agent w w' || p w'
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Existential modal: true at w iff p true at some accessible world.
⟦◇p⟧(w) = ∃w'. R(w,w') ∧ p(w')
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- Semantics.Attitudes.Doxastic.diaAt R agent w worlds p = worlds.any fun (w' : W) => R agent w w' && p w'
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A doxastic predicate is veridical if believing/knowing p entails p is true.
Veridical: know, realize, discover Non-veridical: believe, think, suspect
- veridical : Veridicality
- nonVeridical : Veridicality
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- Semantics.Attitudes.Doxastic.instBEqVeridicality.beq x✝ y✝ = (x✝.ctorIdx == y✝.ctorIdx)
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Common Ground requirement polarity: does the verb place requirements on p or ¬p?
@cite{glass-2025} distinguishes belief verbs by whether their projective content concerns p (positive) or ¬p (negative).
- positive : CGPolarity
- negative : CGPolarity
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- Semantics.Attitudes.Doxastic.instBEqCGPolarity.beq x✝ y✝ = (x✝.ctorIdx == y✝.ctorIdx)
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Common Ground requirement strength: entailment (□) or compatibility (◇)?
necessity: CG must entail the condition (∀w ∈ c. φ(w))possibility: CG must be compatible with the condition (∃w ∈ c. φ(w))
- necessity : CGStrength
- possibility : CGStrength
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- Semantics.Attitudes.Doxastic.instBEqCGStrength.beq x✝ y✝ = (x✝.ctorIdx == y✝.ctorIdx)
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Common Ground requirement for belief verbs.
@cite{glass-2025} proposes a 2×2 typology based on polarity × strength:
- Factive (know): positive × necessity → CG ⊨ p
- Nonfactive (think): no requirement
- Weak contrafactive (yǐwéi): negative × possibility → CG ◇ ¬p
- Strong contrafactive (contra): negative × necessity → CG ⊨ ¬p (UNATTESTED)
The key insight: weak contrafactives exist (Mandarin yǐwéi), but strong contrafactives requiring ¬p to be Common Ground are systematically absent.
- polarity : CGPolarity
- strength : CGStrength
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Factive requirement: CG entails p (know, realize)
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Weak contrafactive: CG compatible with ¬p (Mandarin yǐwéi)
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Strong contrafactive: CG entails ¬p (hypothetical "contra" - UNATTESTED)
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Is this requirement satisfied given a context set and proposition?
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Deriving CG Requirements from Semantic Structure #
@cite{glass-2025} shows that for DOXASTIC verbs, the CG requirement is NOT a separate lexical property - it follows from VERIDICALITY:
- Veridical (know): presupposes p → factive CG requirement
- Non-veridical (believe): no presupposition → no CG requirement
The key insight: cgRequirement should be DERIVED, not stipulated.
Postsuppositions (yǐwéi) #
yǐwéi is special: it has a POSTSUPPOSITION (output-context constraint), not a presupposition (input-context constraint). Its requirement ◇¬p applies AFTER the utterance updates the context.
This is genuinely lexical (exceptional) and not derivable from veridicality.
Derive CG requirement from veridicality for doxastic verbs.
This captures the systematic relationship:
- Veridical verbs presuppose their complement → factive requirement
- Non-veridical verbs have no presupposition → no requirement
Note: Postsuppositions (like yǐwéi's ◇¬p) are NOT captured here because they're about output context, not input presupposition.
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Theorem: Factives have factive CG requirements.
This is a DERIVATION, not a stipulation. The factive presupposition follows from the verb being veridical.
Theorem: Non-veridical verbs have no CG requirement.
This is why believe/think don't presuppose anything about p.
Causal Explanation of the Contrafactive Gap #
Roberts & Özyıldız (2025) propose that the contrafactive gap follows from a general constraint on lexicalization: presupposed content must be causally upstream of at-issue content.
The Predicate Lexicalization Constraint (PLC) #
A verbal predicate V with at-issue content α can have presupposition π iff in the normative world wₙ, a causal chain from π(wₙ) to α(wₙ) can be constructed for any assignment of the arguments of V.
Why Factives Work (know) #
For "Delilah knows that Konstanz is in Germany":
- Presupposition: p (Konstanz is in Germany)
- At-issue: B(d)(p) (Delilah believes Konstanz is in Germany)
Causal chain: p → indic(p) → acq(d)(iₚ) → B(d)(p)
- The fact p generates indicators (evidence) for p
- Delilah can become acquainted with these indicators
- This acquaintance leads to belief formation
Why Strong Contrafactives Don't Work (contra) #
For hypothetical "Marianne contras that the Earth is flat":
- Presupposition: ¬p (Earth is round, i.e., ¬flat)
- At-issue: B(m)(p) (Marianne believes Earth is flat)
NO causal chain: ¬p (ROUND) does NOT generate indicators for p (FLAT)
- ROUND generates indicators for ROUND
- There's no typical causal path from ¬p to B(x)(p)
This asymmetry DERIVES the gap from independent causal-cognitive principles.
A variable in a causal model. Variables can be exogenous (external) or endogenous (determined by structural equations).
- name : String
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- Semantics.Attitudes.Doxastic.instBEqCausalVar.beq { name := a } { name := b } = (a == b)
- Semantics.Attitudes.Doxastic.instBEqCausalVar.beq x✝¹ x✝ = false
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A causal edge represents direct causal influence: (parent, child) means the value of parent directly influences the value of child.
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A causal model M = (U, V, E) where:
- exog: Exogenous variables (determined externally)
- endog: Endogenous variables (determined by structural equations)
- edges: Causal edges representing direct influence
This is a simplified @cite{pearl-2000} causal model for our purposes.
- edges : List CausalEdge
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All variables in the model
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Get parents of a variable (direct causes)
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- M.parents v = List.map (fun (x : Semantics.Attitudes.Doxastic.CausalEdge) => x.parent) (List.filter (fun (x : Semantics.Attitudes.Doxastic.CausalEdge) => x.child == v) M.edges)
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Get children of a variable (direct effects)
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- M.children v = List.map (fun (x : Semantics.Attitudes.Doxastic.CausalEdge) => x.child) (List.filter (fun (x : Semantics.Attitudes.Doxastic.CausalEdge) => x.parent == v) M.edges)
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Check if there's a causal path from v₁ to v₂.
A causal chain exists from v₁ to v₂ iff altering v₁ can alter v₂. This is the transitive closure of the edge relation.
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- M.hasCausalChain v1 v2 = Semantics.Attitudes.Doxastic.CausalModel.hasCausalChain.search M v2 [v1] [] (M.allVars.length + 1)
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- Semantics.Attitudes.Doxastic.CausalModel.hasCausalChain.search M v2 frontier visited 0 = false
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Standard variables in belief formation causal models.
The proposition p being true/false
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- Semantics.Attitudes.Doxastic.BeliefVars.p = { name := "p" }
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The negation ¬p
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- Semantics.Attitudes.Doxastic.BeliefVars.not_p = { name := "¬p" }
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Indicators (evidence) for p: indic(p)
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- Semantics.Attitudes.Doxastic.BeliefVars.indic_p = { name := "indic(p)" }
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Indicators (evidence) for ¬p: indic(¬p)
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- Semantics.Attitudes.Doxastic.BeliefVars.indic_not_p = { name := "indic(¬p)" }
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Agent a acquires indicator for p: acq(a)(iₚ)
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- Semantics.Attitudes.Doxastic.BeliefVars.acq_a_ip = { name := "acq(a)(iₚ)" }
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Agent a acquires indicator for ¬p: acq(a)(i¬ₚ)
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- Semantics.Attitudes.Doxastic.BeliefVars.acq_a_inp = { name := "acq(a)(i¬ₚ)" }
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Agent believes p: B(a)(p)
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- Semantics.Attitudes.Doxastic.BeliefVars.B_a_p = { name := "B(a)(p)" }
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Agent believes ¬p: B(a)(¬p)
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- Semantics.Attitudes.Doxastic.BeliefVars.B_a_not_p = { name := "B(a)(¬p)" }
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The standard causal model for knowledge/belief formation.
This captures the Roberts & Özyıldız insight that:
- Facts generate indicators (evidence)
- Agents acquire indicators through experience
- Acquisition of indicators leads to belief formation
Key structural equations:
- indic(p) := p ∨ q (p is sufficient for its indicators; q = other sources)
- acq(a)(iₚ) := indic(p) ∧ exp(a)(iₚ) (acquaintance requires indicator + experience)
- B(a)(p) := acq(a)(iₚ) (belief results from acquaintance with evidence)
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Predicate Lexicalization Constraint (PLC)
A verbal predicate with at-issue content α can have presupposition π iff there exists a causal chain from π to α in the belief formation model.
This is the central constraint from Roberts & Özyıldız (2025).
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- Semantics.Attitudes.Doxastic.satisfiesPLC presup atIssue M = M.hasCausalChain presup atIssue
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Theorem: Factives satisfy the PLC
For "x knows p":
- Presupposition: p
- At-issue: B(a)(p)
- Causal chain: p → indic(p) → acq(a)(iₚ) → B(a)(p) ✓
Theorem: Strong contrafactives VIOLATE the PLC
For hypothetical "x contras p":
- Presupposition: ¬p
- At-issue: B(a)(p)
- NO causal chain from ¬p to B(a)(p) ✗
This is because ¬p generates indicators for ¬p, not for p. The fact that the Earth is round does not generate evidence that the Earth is flat.
The Contrafactive Gap Theorem
The asymmetry between factives and strong contrafactives follows from the Predicate Lexicalization Constraint:
- Factives (know): presup p → at-issue B(a)(p) — PLC SATISFIED
- Strong contrafactives (contra): presup ¬p → at-issue B(a)(p) — PLC VIOLATED
This DERIVES the gap from the independently motivated causal constraint.
Corollary: The asymmetry is structural, not stipulated
The contrafactive gap emerges from the structure of belief formation:
- Beliefs are formed based on evidence
- Evidence for p comes from p being true
- Evidence for p does NOT come from ¬p being true
Therefore any predicate trying to presuppose ¬p while asserting B(x)(p) is describing a causally incoherent eventuality.
Weak Contrafactives (yǐwéi) and the PLC #
Weak contrafactives like Mandarin yǐwéi don't violate the PLC because their projective content is fundamentally different:
Not a presupposition: @cite{glass-2025} argues yǐwéi's falsity inference is a postsupposition (about output context) not presupposition (input)
Different requirement: yǐwéi requires CG ◇ ¬p (CG compatible with ¬p), not CG ⊨ ¬p (CG entails ¬p)
No causal incoherence: "p is unsettled in CG" is compatible with "there's evidence for p that x acquired" — these are about different epistemic states (communal knowledge vs individual belief)
The PLC only constrains the relationship between presupposition and at-issue content within the SAME eventuality. Postsuppositions about discourse context update are not subject to this constraint.
Weak contrafactive is NOT a strong contrafactive - different structure. The requirement is ∃w ∈ CG. ¬p(w), not ∀w ∈ CG. ¬p(w).
Veridicality constraint: if veridical, accessible worlds ⊆ actual world's p-value.
For "know", we require: p(w) = true for the evaluation world w.
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A doxastic attitude predicate.
Bundles the accessibility relation with veridicality and other properties.
- name : String
Name of the predicate
- access : AccessRel W E
Accessibility relation
- veridicality : Veridicality
Veridicality (veridical or not)
- createsOpaqueContext : Bool
Does it create an opaque context? (substitution failures)
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Semantics for a doxastic predicate taking a proposition.
⟦x V that p⟧(w) = (veridicalityHolds V p w) ∧ ∀w'. R(x,w,w') → p(w')
For veridical predicates, we also require p(w) = true.
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- V.holdsAt agent p w worlds = (Semantics.Attitudes.Doxastic.veridicalityHolds V.veridicality p w && Semantics.Attitudes.Doxastic.boxAt V.access agent w worlds p)
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Semantics for doxastic predicate taking a Hamblin question.
Following @cite{karttunen-1977}, "know Q" means knowing the true answer: ⟦x knows Q⟧(w) = ∃p ∈ Q. p(w) ∧ x knows p
For non-veridical predicates, we drop the p(w) requirement: ⟦x believes Q⟧(w) = ∃p ∈ Q. x believes p
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Abstract "believe" predicate template.
Users instantiate with their specific accessibility relation.
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- Semantics.Attitudes.Doxastic.believeTemplate R = { name := "believe", access := R, veridicality := Semantics.Attitudes.Doxastic.Veridicality.nonVeridical }
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Abstract "know" predicate template.
Veridical: knowing p requires p to be true.
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- Semantics.Attitudes.Doxastic.knowTemplate R = { name := "know", access := R, veridicality := Semantics.Attitudes.Doxastic.Veridicality.veridical }
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Abstract "think" predicate template.
Non-veridical, typically less commitment than "believe".
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- Semantics.Attitudes.Doxastic.thinkTemplate R = { name := "think", access := R, veridicality := Semantics.Attitudes.Doxastic.Veridicality.nonVeridical }
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Veridical predicates entail their complement.
If x knows p at w, then p is true at w.
Non-veridical predicates don't entail their complement.
There exist cases where x believes p but p is false.
Doxastic predicates are closed under known implication.
If x knows p and x knows (p → q), then x knows q. (This is the K axiom of modal logic)
Substitution and Opacity #
Opaque contexts block substitution of co-referential terms.
Even if a = b (extensionally), "x believes Fa" may differ from "x believes Fb" because the agent may not know a = b.
This is formalized by the createsOpaqueContext field: when true, the predicate
operates on intensions (functions from worlds), not extensions.
For opaque predicates, substitution failure is possible.
This is a statement that the predicate distinguishes intensions that happen to have the same extension at the evaluation world.
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De dicto reading: quantifier under the attitude.
"John believes someone is a spy" (de dicto) = John believes ∃x. spy(x)
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- Semantics.Attitudes.Doxastic.deDicto V agent p w worlds = V.holdsAt agent p w worlds
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De re reading: quantifier over the attitude.
"John believes someone is a spy" (de re) = ∃x. John believes spy(x)
Here we need a domain of individuals to quantify over.
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- Semantics.Attitudes.Doxastic.deRe V agent predicate domain w worlds = domain.any fun (x : D) => V.holdsAt agent (predicate x) w worlds
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Attitude Embedding and Scalar Implicature #
When scalar expressions are embedded under attitudes, the implicature can be computed locally (inside the attitude) or globally (about speaker):
Global: Speaker implicates ¬(speaker believes all) Local: x believes (some ∧ ¬all) [apparent local reading]
@cite{goodman-stuhlmuller-2013} show the "local" reading arises from pragmatic inference about speaker knowledge, not true local computation.
See RSA/Implementations/GoodmanStuhlmuller2013.lean for the RSA treatment.
Map veridicality to @cite{searle-1983}'s psychological mode.
Veridical attitudes (know, realize) are like perception: the world must cause the mental state (you can only know p if p is the case and your epistemic state is appropriately caused by p's being the case). Non-veridical attitudes (believe, think) are like belief: satisfaction depends only on whether p obtains, not on the causal chain.
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Veridical attitudes are causally self-referential (world→state); non-veridical attitudes are not. This connects the linguistic veridicality distinction to @cite{searle-1983}'s metaphysics: knowledge requires the world to cause the knowing, while belief requires only that the content match reality.