Documentation

Linglib.Core.Discourse.SpeechActs

Speech Acts and Intentional States #

@cite{searle-1969} @cite{searle-1979} @cite{searle-1983} @cite{kaplan-1989} @cite{lakoff-1970} @cite{speas-tenny-2003} @cite{brandom-1994} @cite{gunlogson-2001} @cite{krifka-2015} @cite{bring-gunlogson-2000} @cite{romero-2024}

Unified infrastructure for speech acts, Intentional states, and their relationship — the parallel that @cite{searle-1983} argues is constitutive of both language and mind.

The Central Parallel #

@cite{searle-1983}'s core thesis: Intentional states (beliefs, desires, intentions) and speech acts (assertions, orders, promises) share identical logical structure:

Four points of similarity:

  1. The content/mode distinction applies to both
  2. Direction of fit applies to both
  3. Sincerity conditions link them: performing F(p) expresses S(r)
  4. Conditions of satisfaction are determined by content + direction of fit

Organization #

The two fundamental discourse participants. .addressee matches KContext.addressee (not .listener as in Semantics.Dynamic).

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      Illocutionary mood — the speech-act force of an utterance.

      Distinct from GramMood (indicative/subjunctive morphology) and the Minimalist SAPMood (configurational). This classifies the pragmatic act performed — the F in F(p).

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          def Core.Discourse.resolveRole {W : Type u_1} {E : Type u_2} {P : Type u_3} {T : Type u_4} (tower : Context.ContextTower (Context.KContext W E P T)) :

          Resolve a discourse role to a concrete entity via a ContextTower, reading from the origin (speech-act context). .speaker -> tower.origin.agent, .addressee -> tower.origin.addressee.

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            Direction of fit: how responsibility for matching is distributed between the Intentional state (or speech act) and the world.

            @cite{searle-1983}'s key classification principle. The metaphor: if a shopper's list doesn't match what's in the cart, the list is at fault (mind-to-world). If a builder's blueprint doesn't match the building, the building is at fault (world-to-mind).

            • mindToWorld : DirectionOfFit

              Mind-to-world: the state must match independently existing reality. Beliefs, perceptions, assertions. If wrong, the state is at fault.

            • worldToMind : DirectionOfFit

              World-to-mind: the world must be changed to match the state. Desires, intentions, orders, promises. If unfulfilled, the world is at fault.

            • null : DirectionOfFit

              Null direction: the state presupposes the truth of its content but imposes no fit responsibility. Expressives (apologies, congratulations).

            • double : DirectionOfFit

              Double direction: both mind-to-world and world-to-mind simultaneously. Declarations bring about a state of affairs by representing it as obtaining.

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                @cite{searle-1979}'s five basic categories of illocutionary acts, derived from the mind's representational capacities. These are exhaustive and mutually exclusive. Restated in @cite{searle-1983} Ch. 6: "the taxonomy is fundamentally a reflection of the various ways in which representations can have directions of fit."

                • assertive : SearleClass

                  We tell people how things are (assertions, statements, descriptions).

                • directive : SearleClass

                  We try to get people to do things (orders, commands, requests).

                • commissive : SearleClass

                  We commit ourselves to doing things (promises, vows, pledges).

                • declaration : SearleClass

                  We bring about changes by representing them as obtaining (verdicts, appointments).

                • expressive : SearleClass

                  We express feelings about presupposed states of affairs (apologies, congratulations).

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                    Direction of fit for an illocutionary mood, derived via Searle class.

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                      Named psychological modes: the "S" in @cite{searle-1983}'s S(r) notation.

                      Parallel to illocutionary force "F" in F(p) for speech acts. Each mode has a direction of fit and may or may not be causally self-referential.

                      @cite{searle-1983}, Ch. 1: belief, desire, and intention are the prototypical modes. Perception (Ch. 2) is a causally self-referential mode that plays a key role in the theory's account of how the mind relates to the world.

                      • belief : PsychMode

                        Bel(p): satisfied iff p obtains. Not self-referential — HOW p came to obtain is irrelevant (Ch. 1, p. 8).

                      • desire : PsychMode

                        Des(p): satisfied iff p comes about. Not self-referential — HOW p is brought about is irrelevant (Ch. 1, p. 8).

                      • intention : PsychMode

                        Int(p): satisfied iff p is brought about BY WAY OF carrying out this intention. Self-referential: state→world (Ch. 3, pp. 85–86).

                      • perception : PsychMode

                        Per(p): satisfied iff the object/state of affairs CAUSES this experience. Self-referential: world→state (Ch. 2; Ch. 3, p. 91).

                      • expressive : PsychMode

                        Expressive states (pleasure, sorrow, etc.): presuppose the truth of their content but impose no fit responsibility (Ch. 1, pp. 7–8).

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                          The sincerity condition: performing a speech act with mood F necessarily expresses the corresponding Intentional state S, and the conditions of satisfaction of the speech act are identical to those of the expressed state.

                          @cite{searle-1983}, Ch. 1 §3: you can't say "It's snowing but I don't believe it's snowing" — the assertion eo ipso expresses the belief. Ch. 6, p. 174: "the conditions of satisfaction of the sincerity condition" are "identical with the conditions of satisfaction" of the speech act.

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                            Causal self-referentiality: whether the Intentional state must itself figure in the causal chain producing its conditions of satisfaction.

                            Beliefs: no self-referentiality — satisfied iff the state of affairs obtains. Intentions: self-referential — "my arm goes up as a result of this intention." Perceptions: self-referential in reverse — the object must cause the experience.

                            • none : CausalSelfRef

                              Not self-referential: satisfaction depends only on the state of affairs obtaining. Example: beliefs.

                            • stateToWorld : CausalSelfRef

                              State-to-world: the state must cause its conditions of satisfaction. Example: intentions — "by way of carrying out this intention."

                            • worldToState : CausalSelfRef

                              World-to-state: the conditions of satisfaction must cause the state. Example: perceptions — the object causes the visual experience.

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                                Causal self-referentiality for each psychological mode.

                                @cite{searle-1983}, Ch. 3 (table on p. 91): self-referentiality is NOT determined by direction of fit alone. Both beliefs and perceptions have mind-to-world fit, but only perceptions are self-referential. Both desires and intentions have world-to-mind fit, but only intentions are.

                                • Perception: the object must cause the experience (world→state)
                                • Intention: the intention must cause its conditions of satisfaction (state→world)
                                • Belief/Desire: satisfaction depends only on whether the state of affairs obtains
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                                  structure Core.Discourse.IntentionalState (W : Type u_1) :
                                  Type u_1

                                  An Intentional state: psychological mode + representative content.

                                  @cite{searle-1983}, Ch. 1: "every Intentional state consists of a representative content in a psychological mode." Symbolized S(r).

                                  Conditions of satisfaction are determined by the content under the direction of fit given by the mode — they are internal to the state.

                                  • mode : PsychMode

                                    The psychological mode (belief, desire, intention, ...)

                                  • content : BProp W

                                    The representative content

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                                    Conditions of satisfaction: what must obtain for the state to be satisfied. These are identical to the content — not a separate component.

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                                      An agent's public discourse commitments: a list of propositions the agent has publicly committed to.

                                      Following @cite{krifka-2015}: the commitment slate tracks what an agent is publicly committed to, which may diverge from what they privately believe (as in lying, hedging, or performing).

                                      In @cite{searle-1983}'s terms: commitment is the public direction-of-fit obligation created by performing a speech act. Asserting p creates a mind-to-world commitment (the speaker is responsible if p is false); promising p creates a world-to-mind commitment (the speaker is responsible if p is unfulfilled).

                                      • commitments : List (BProp W)

                                        The propositions the agent is publicly committed to

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                                        The empty commitment slate: no public commitments.

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                                          Add a commitment to the slate.

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                                            Retract a commitment (remove first occurrence).

                                            Not all theories support retraction. Stalnaker's CG model has no retraction mechanism; Krifka and Brandom do.

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                                              Convert commitments to a context set: the worlds compatible with all committed propositions.

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                                                Check if the slate entails a proposition (holds at all compatible worlds).

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                                                  Empty slate is trivial: all worlds are compatible.

                                                  Adding a commitment restricts the context set.

                                                  theorem Core.Discourse.Commitment.CommitmentSlate.add_entails {W : Type u_1} (s : CommitmentSlate W) (p : BProp W) (w : W) :
                                                  (s.add p).toContextSet w = truep w = true

                                                  Adding a commitment entails the added proposition.

                                                  The source of a discourse commitment.

                                                  @cite{gunlogson-2001}: commitments are marked by their epistemic source. The source determines challengeability: self-generated commitments can be challenged by the addressee; other-generated commitments can be challenged by the speaker.

                                                  • selfGenerated : CommitmentSource

                                                    Commitment generated from agent's own evidence/beliefs

                                                  • otherGenerated : CommitmentSource

                                                    Commitment attributed to another participant

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                                                      A commitment tagged with its source.

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                                                        A source-tagged commitment slate.

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                                                          The empty tagged slate.

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                                                            Add a tagged commitment.

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                                                              Get all self-generated commitments.

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                                                                Get all other-generated commitments.

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                                                                  Convert to a plain (untagged) commitment slate.

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                                                                    Convert to context set (ignoring source tags).

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                                                                      Contextual evidence bias.

                                                                      Expectation about p induced by evidence available in the current discourse situation (@cite{bring-gunlogson-2000}). Used as:

                                                                      • A felicity condition on rising declaratives
                                                                      • A bias dimension for polar questions
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                                                                          Preparatory conditions for directive speech acts.

                                                                          @cite{searle-1969}: for a request to be felicitous, the hearer must satisfy certain preconditions — ability to comply and willingness to comply. @cite{francik-clark-1985} show that speakers design indirect requests to target the specific preparatory condition most at risk, refining "ability" into a subsumption hierarchy:

                                                                          ability
                                                                          ├── knowledge
                                                                          │   ├── memory       ("Do you remember?")
                                                                          │   └── perception   ("Did you see/hear/notice?")
                                                                          └── permission       ("Are you allowed?")
                                                                          willingness           ("Would you mind?")
                                                                          

                                                                          More specific conditions correspond to more specific (less direct) request forms.

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                                                                              Subsumption: c₁.subsumes c₂ iff satisfying c₂ entails satisfying c₁.

                                                                              Memory and perception are subtypes of knowledge; knowledge and permission are subtypes of ability. Willingness is independent.

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                                                                                Directives are the speech act class that has preparatory conditions on the hearer's ability and willingness.

                                                                                theorem Core.Discourse.resolveRole_shift_invariant {W : Type u_1} {E : Type u_2} {P : Type u_3} {T : Type u_4} (tower : Context.ContextTower (Context.KContext W E P T)) (σ : Context.ContextShift (Context.KContext W E P T)) (r : DiscourseRole) :
                                                                                resolveRole (tower.push σ) r = resolveRole tower r

                                                                                Discourse role resolution is invariant under tower push: discourse roles reflect speech-act participants (from origin), not embedded ones.

                                                                                @cite{searle-1983}'s central parallel: the direction of fit of the sincerity condition matches the direction of fit of the speech act class.

                                                                                Asserting p expresses a mind-to-world state (belief); ordering p expresses a world-to-mind state (desire); promising p expresses a world-to-mind state (intention). This is constitutive (@cite{searle-1983}, Ch. 1 §3).

                                                                                @cite{searle-1983}'s key insight (Ch. 3, p. 91): causal self-referentiality is NOT determined by direction of fit alone. Beliefs and perceptions share mind-to-world fit, but only perceptions are self-referential.

                                                                                Conditions of satisfaction are internal to the content — not a separate component. This rfl proof IS the formalization of @cite{searle-1983}'s claim (Ch. 1, p. 12): "the Intentional content determines the conditions of satisfaction."

                                                                                A commitment slate projects to a context set: the worlds compatible with all committed propositions.

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