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Linglib.Theories.Semantics.Modality.Kernel

Kernel Semantics for Epistemic Modals #

@cite{von-fintel-gillies-2010} @cite{von-fintel-gillies-2021}

@cite{von-fintel-gillies-2010} kernel semantics. Epistemic modals carry an evidential presupposition that the prejacent is not directly settled by the kernel K ⊆ B_K. The central result (entailment_settling_gap) is that B_K can entail φ without K directly settling it, making the presupposition non-trivial.

The 2021 paper extends the analysis to can't, exposing a dilemma for the weakness Mantra: no assignment of force to can't simultaneously explains its evidential distribution (Observation 4) and its incompatibility with it's possible (Observation 5). Kernel semantics resolves this because can't φ = must(¬φ) is simultaneously strong and evidentially constrained.

Helpers #

Kernel structure (@cite{von-fintel-gillies-2010} Def 4) #

A kernel: a set of direct-information propositions with B_K = ⋂K.

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    Convert to a context-independent modal base.

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      φ follows from K iff B_K ⊆ ⟦φ⟧.

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        Induce an EpistemicFlavor for Kratzer modal evaluation.

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          World-dependent kernel assignment K^c(w).

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            Convert to a Kratzer modal base.

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              Settling (@cite{von-fintel-gillies-2010} Def 5) #

              K directly settles P iff some X ∈ K entails P or is incompatible with P (Implementation 1).

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                Refine a partition along φ-boundaries (@cite{von-fintel-gillies-2010} subject matter).

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                  K settles P via partition iff P is a union of cells in S_K (Implementation 2).

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                    What both implementations share: settling implies entailment. If K directly settles φ (Implementation 1), then B_K ⊆ ⟦φ⟧ or B_K ⊆ ⟦¬φ⟧. If X ∈ K entails φ then B_K ⊆ X ⊆ ⟦φ⟧; if X excludes φ then B_K ⊆ X ⊆ ⟦¬φ⟧.

                    Partition settling implies entailment: if S_K settles φ then B_K ⊆ ⟦φ⟧ or B_K ⊆ ⟦¬φ⟧. All worlds in B_K agree on every X ∈ K (they all satisfy every X), so they occupy a single cell of S_K. If that cell is φ-uniform, B_K inherits the uniformity.

                    ⟦must φ⟧: presupposes K doesn't settle φ; asserts B_K ⊆ ⟦φ⟧.

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                      ⟦might φ⟧: presupposes K doesn't settle φ; asserts B_K ∩ ⟦φ⟧ ≠ ∅.

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                        World-dependent ⟦must φ⟧.

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                          World-dependent ⟦might φ⟧.

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                            Core properties #

                            Must is strong: when defined, must φ = universal necessity over B_K.

                            T axiom: must φ entails φ when B_K is realistic (w ∈ B_K).

                            Duality: might φ ↔ ¬(must ¬φ) in assertion content.

                            Empty kernel: nothing is settled, so must is always defined.

                            Bridge to Kratzer.lean #

                            Kernel must assertion = full Kratzer necessity with empty ordering.

                            This extends kernelMust_eq_simpleNecessity by connecting through kernelMust_eq_simpleNecessity: kernel must = simple necessity.

                            Kernel must assertion = Kratzer necessity evaluated via EpistemicFlavor.

                            This bridges the kernel (@cite{von-fintel-gillies-2010}) to Kratzer's parametric semantics: kernel must is exactly Kratzer necessity with the kernel's epistemic flavor.

                            World-dependent kernel must = world-dependent Kratzer necessity.

                            kernelMustW kb φ asserts necessity (kb.toModalBase) emptyBackground φ at each world.

                            Mastermind example (@cite{von-fintel-gillies-2010} pp. 365–366) #

                            w0 = red, w1 = blue, w2 = green, w3 = unknown. K = {redOrBlue, notRed}, B_K = {w1}.

                            Non-equivalence of the two implementations (@cite{von-fintel-gillies-2010} §7, p. 379) #

                            The explicit and partition-based implementations of "directly settles" are non-equivalent. Implementation 1 settles supersets of K-propositions that Implementation 2 misses; Implementation 2 settles propositions determined jointly by K-propositions that no single proposition settles. Both, however, imply entailment (see explicit_implies_entailment and partition_implies_entailment above).

                            Counterexample (Impl 1 ↛ Impl 2): K = {red}, φ = redOrBlue. red ⊆ redOrBlue so Impl 1 settles, but S_K = {{w0},{w1,w2,w3}} and the cell {w1,w2,w3} straddles redOrBlue.

                            Counterexample (Impl 2 ↛ Impl 1): K = mastermindK, φ = blue. No single X ∈ K entails or excludes blue, but S_K = {{w0},{w1},{w2,w3}} resolves blue into a union of cells.

                            Entailment does not imply partition settling: B_K ⊆ ⟦φ⟧ does not guarantee S_K settles φ. Same witness as explicit_not_implies_partition: K = {red} entails redOrBlue (B_K = {w0} ⊆ ⟦redOrBlue⟧) but the partition cell {w1,w2,w3} straddles redOrBlue.

                            Deep theorems (@cite{von-fintel-gillies-2010}) #

                            Entailment-settling gap: B_K can entail φ without K settling it. This gap makes the evidential presupposition non-trivial: must φ can be simultaneously defined and true.

                            theorem Semantics.Modality.modus_ponens_with_must (k : Kernel) (φ ψ : BProp Attitudes.Intensional.World) (w : Attitudes.Intensional.World) (hReal : w k.base) (_hDef : (kernelMust k ψ).presup w = true) (hCond : φ w = true(kernelMust k ψ).assertion w = true) (hPhi : φ w = true) :
                            ψ w = true

                            Modus ponens with must (@cite{von-fintel-gillies-2010} Arg 4.3.1): the argument form "if φ, must ψ; φ; ∴ ψ" is valid under realistic B_K.

                            Must-perhaps contradiction (@cite{von-fintel-gillies-2010} Arg 4.3.2): must φ ∧ might ¬φ is contradictory. When B_K ⊆ ⟦φ⟧, we have B_K ∩ ⟦¬φ⟧ = ∅.

                            Direct evidence infelicity: when K settles φ, must φ is undefined.

                            Settling is monotone: more propositions in K means more is settled.

                            Can't dilemma (@cite{von-fintel-gillies-2021} §4, Observations 4–5) #

                            The Mantra faces a dilemma: no assignment of force to can't simultaneously explains its evidential distribution (paralleling must) and its incompatibility with it's possible that φ. Kernel semantics resolves this because can't φ = must(¬φ) is strong AND evidentially constrained.

                            Can't–might exclusion (@cite{von-fintel-gillies-2021} Obs 5): when can't φ holds (B_K ⊆ ⟦¬φ⟧), might φ is false (B_K ∩ ⟦φ⟧ = ∅).

                            Can't entails negation (@cite{von-fintel-gillies-2021} via S2): when B_K is realistic and can't φ is defined and true, φ(w) = false.

                            Can't evidential parallelism (@cite{von-fintel-gillies-2021} Obs 4): can't φ has the same presupposition structure as must(¬φ).

                            Direct evidence blocks can't, paralleling must: when K settles ¬φ, can't φ has presupposition failure.

                            can't φ and must(¬φ) are intensionally identical.

                            Prior information state and nandao-Q felicity #

                            @cite{zheng-2025} shows Mandarin nandao-Qs are evidence-driven, not bias-driven. The felicity condition has three parts: (i) evidence in K supports the prejacent, (ii) K conflicts with prior expectations U, (iii) the prejacent is not directly settled in K. Condition (iii) is the same presupposition as kernelMust.

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                            Prior information state (beliefs, norms, desires) before encountering evidence. Distinct from the kernel (direct evidence) and the CG (shared).

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                              B_U = ⋂U: worlds compatible with the prior information state.

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                                K and U are incompatible: B_K ∩ B_U = ∅ (the evidence is unexpected).

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                                  Evidence p raises the probability of φ: P(φ|p) > P(φ). Computed via cross-multiplication to avoid rationals.

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                                    Some proposition in K raises the probability of φ (condition i).

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                                      Nandao-Q felicity (@cite{zheng-2025}, condition 11 for polar questions): (i) some evidence in K raises P(φ), (ii) K and U are incompatible (evidence is unexpected), (iii) φ is not directly settled in K.

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                                        Pure inquiry: nandao is felicitous without epistemic bias (@cite{zheng-2025} ex. 3). The three conditions suffice; no prior belief about φ is required.

                                        Dripping raincoat scenario (@cite{zheng-2025} exx. 2–3, 5) #

                                        w0 = raining, w1 = sprinkler (wet but not rain), w2 = dry, w3 = unknown. K = {wearingRaincoat}: direct evidence that someone entered with a wet coat. U = {expectDry}: prior expectation of no rain (normative or doxastic).

                                        "Nandao waimian xiayu-le ma?" is felicitous with a dripping raincoat. P(rain|coat) = 1/2 > P(rain) = 1/4; K ∩ U = ∅; rain unsettled by K.

                                        Without evidence, nandao is infelicitous (@cite{zheng-2025} ex. 5 ctx 2).

                                        When evidence is expected (K compatible with U), nandao is infelicitous (@cite{zheng-2025} ex. 6 ctx 2).

                                        Nandao reuses the mastermind kernel: "must blue" and "nandao blue?" share condition (iii). When must is defined, nandao's indirectness condition holds.