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Linglib.Theories.Semantics.Lexical.Noun.Kind.Carlson1977

A Unified Analysis of the English Bare Plural #

@cite{carlson-1977}

Linguistics and Philosophy 1(3): 413--457, 1977.

The Core Insight #

Bare plurals are proper names of kinds, which are abstract individuals that can be spatially unbounded. The generic/existential distinction arises from the PREDICATE, not from an ambiguous determiner.

Sorted Ontology (§4) #

@cite{carlson-1977} partitions entities into three sorts:

The realization relation R connects stages to the individuals/kinds they realize. R is sorted: its domain is stages, its range is individuals or kinds. This rules out pathological configurations (kinds realizing kinds, stages of stages) and is captured formally in CarlsonModel.

Predicate Level #

@cite{milsark-1974} and @cite{siegel-1976} distinguished:

@cite{carlson-1977} connects this to bare plural interpretation:

The existential comes from the predicate (via R), not from the NP.

Habitual Readings (§4) #

For habitual readings like "Dogs run" in simple present tense, @cite{carlson-1977} treats the habitual as direct kind predication:

"Dogs run" → run'(d)

The habitual is individual/kind-level — run' is predicated directly of the kind, just like intelligent'. The progressive turns it stage-level:

"Dogs are running" → ∃x[R(x, d) ∧ run'(x)]

Later work (@cite{krifka-etal-1995} and others) introduced a covert GEN operator for habituals, but @cite{carlson-1977} handles them via direct kind predication without any generic quantifier.

Connection to Subsequent Work #

See Phenomena/Generics/Compare.lean for cross-theory comparison.

The three ontological sorts in @cite{carlson-1977}'s system (§4).

Entities are partitioned into stages, (ordinary) individuals, and kinds. This three-way distinction is the foundation: the realization relation R only connects stages to individuals/kinds, never the reverse.

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      A Carlson model: a sorted domain with a typed realization relation R.

      The sort constraints on R capture genuine formal content from §4:

      • R_domain: only stages realize things (R's source is always a stage)
      • R_range: stages realize individuals or kinds (R's target is never a stage)

      These constraints rule out pathological models where kinds realize kinds, individuals are stages of other individuals, or R chains through stages.

      • sort : EntityEntitySort

        Sort assignment: every entity has exactly one sort.

      • R : EntityEntityProp

        R(y, x): y is a realization (stage) of x.

      • R_domain (y x : Entity) : self.R y xself.sort y = EntitySort.stage

        R's domain is stages: only stages realize anything.

      • R_range (y x : Entity) : self.R y xself.sort x = EntitySort.individual self.sort x = EntitySort.kind

        R's range is individuals or kinds: stages realize persistent entities.

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        The realization relation: x R y means "x is a stage/realization of y."

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          Stage-level vs individual-level predicate classification.

          • Stage-level ("states" in @cite{milsark-1974}): hungry, available, in the room
          • Individual-level ("properties"): intelligent, tall, a mammal

          This determines whether bare plurals get existential or generic readings.

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              @[reducible, inline]

              Individual-level predicate semantics: direct predication of the kind.

              ⟦be intelligent⟧ = I'

              "Dogs are intelligent" = I'(d) where d is the kind DOGS. No existential quantifier involved.

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                def Semantics.Lexical.Noun.Kind.Carlson1977.stageLevelPred (Entity : Type) (R : RealizationRel Entity) (P : EntityBool) :
                EntityProp

                Stage-level predicate semantics: predication via the R relation.

                ⟦be in the yard⟧ = λx.∃y[R(y,x) ∧ in-yard'(y)]

                "Dogs are in the yard" = ∃y[R(y,d) ∧ in-yard'(y)]

                The existential comes from THE PREDICATE, not from the NP. This is why bare plurals get existential readings with stage-level predicates.

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                  def Semantics.Lexical.Noun.Kind.Carlson1977.progressive (Entity : Type) (R : RealizationRel Entity) (P : EntityBool) :
                  EntityProp

                  The progressive turns any predicate into stage-level (§4, p. 450).

                  @cite{carlson-1977}: the progressive has "the function of predicating a verb of a stage, but not of an individual."

                  • "Dogs run" → run'(d) (habitual — individual-level, direct kind predication)
                  • "Dogs are running" → ∃x[R(x,d) ∧ run'(x)] (progressive makes it stage-level)
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                    Generic reading derivation: individual-level predicate + kind.

                    "Dogs are intelligent"

                    1. ⟦dogs⟧ = d (the kind)
                    2. ⟦be intelligent⟧ = I' (individual-level)
                    3. Composition: I'(d)

                    Result: A property is directly attributed to the kind.

                    This also covers habitual readings in @cite{carlson-1977}'s system: "Dogs run" = run'(d), where the habitual is individual/kind-level.

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                      def Semantics.Lexical.Noun.Kind.Carlson1977.existentialDerivation {Entity : Type} (R : RealizationRel Entity) (kind : Entity) (stagePred : EntityBool) :

                      Existential reading derivation: stage-level predicate + kind.

                      "Dogs are in the yard"

                      1. ⟦dogs⟧ = d (the kind)
                      2. ⟦be in the yard⟧ = λx.∃y[R(y,x) ∧ in-yard'(y)] (stage-level)
                      3. Composition: ∃y[R(y,d) ∧ in-yard'(y)]

                      Result: The predicate introduces existential quantification over stages.

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                        theorem Semantics.Lexical.Noun.Kind.Carlson1977.bare_plural_not_ambiguous {Entity : Type} (kind : Entity) (R : RealizationRel Entity) (indPred : IndividualLevelPred Entity) (stagePred : EntityBool) :
                        genericDerivation kind indPred = indPred kind existentialDerivation R kind stagePred = (y : Entity), R y kind stagePred y = true

                        @cite{carlson-1977}'s central claim: the bare plural is never ambiguous.

                        The different "readings" (generic vs existential) arise from:

                        1. The predicate's level (individual vs stage)
                        2. Not from different meanings of the NP

                        This is why there's no scope ambiguity with bare plurals — they're just proper names, and proper names don't scope.

                        def Semantics.Lexical.Noun.Kind.Carlson1977.barePluralTranslation {Entity : Type} (k : Entity) :
                        (EntityBool)Bool

                        Bare plural semantics: λP.P{k} (§4, p. 450)

                        "'Dogs' translates as: λPP{d}."

                        Just like "Jake" denotes the individual Jake, "dogs" denotes the kind DOGS. No determiner, no quantifier — just a proper name.

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                          Bare plurals behave like proper names, not quantifiers.

                          The bare plural "dogs" denotes a fixed entity k. Applying any predicate P to the bare plural just evaluates P at k — no quantificational structure, no scope interaction.

                          theorem Semantics.Lexical.Noun.Kind.Carlson1977.kind_cannot_realize {Entity : Type} (M : CarlsonModel Entity) {k x : Entity} (hk : M.sort k = EntitySort.kind) (hR : M.R k x) :

                          Kinds can't realize anything: only stages are in R's domain.

                          If k has sort .kind, then R(k, x) is impossible — because R_domain requires the source to be a stage, and kind ≠ stage.

                          theorem Semantics.Lexical.Noun.Kind.Carlson1977.individual_cannot_realize {Entity : Type} (M : CarlsonModel Entity) {i x : Entity} (hi : M.sort i = EntitySort.individual) (hR : M.R i x) :

                          Individuals can't realize anything either: R's domain is stages only.

                          theorem Semantics.Lexical.Noun.Kind.Carlson1977.R_no_chain {Entity : Type} (M : CarlsonModel Entity) {z y x : Entity} (hRyx : M.R y x) (hRzy : M.R z y) :

                          R doesn't chain: there are no "stages of stages."

                          If R(y, x) and R(z, y), then y must be simultaneously:

                          • a stage (from R_domain applied to R(y, x))
                          • an individual or kind (from R_range applied to R(z, y))

                          Sort disjointness gives a contradiction. This means the ontological hierarchy has exactly depth 1: stages realize individuals/kinds, full stop.

                          theorem Semantics.Lexical.Noun.Kind.Carlson1977.stage_witness_is_stage {Entity : Type} (M : CarlsonModel Entity) (P : EntityBool) (k : Entity) (h : stageLevelPred Entity M.R P k) :
                          (y : Entity), M.R y k P y = true M.sort y = EntitySort.stage

                          Stage-level predication of a kind: the existential witness is a stage.

                          When P is stage-level and we evaluate stageLevelPred R P k, the witness y satisfying R(y, k) ∧ P(y) is guaranteed to be a stage by R_domain. This is a genuine constraint: the thing that "is in the yard" when we say "Dogs are in the yard" must be a spatiotemporally bounded entity.

                          Individual-level predication bypasses stages entirely.

                          When P is individual-level, genericDerivation k P applies P directly to k. No R relation is involved, so no stage-sorting constraint applies.

                          def Semantics.Lexical.Noun.Kind.Carlson1977.beEverywhere {Entity : Type} (R : RealizationRel Entity) (places : List Entity) (atPred : EntityEntityBool) :
                          EntityProp

                          "be everywhere" as a stage-level predicate over locations (§4, p. 454).

                          ∀y[Place'(y) → ∃z[R(z,k) ∧ At(z,y)]]
                          

                          Different places can have different realizations — this is why "Dogs were everywhere" is natural (different dogs in different places) while "A dog was everywhere" is bizarre (same dog everywhere).

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                            theorem Semantics.Lexical.Noun.Kind.Carlson1977.kind_allows_differentiated_scope {Entity : Type} (R : RealizationRel Entity) (k : Entity) (places : List Entity) (atPred : EntityEntityBool) :
                            beEverywhere R places atPred k = ∀ (p : Entity), p places (y : Entity), R y k atPred y p = true

                            Differentiated scope: for a kind k, "k was everywhere" allows different realizations at each place. The ∃ over stages is INSIDE the ∀ over places.

                            theorem Semantics.Lexical.Noun.Kind.Carlson1977.differentiated_scope_witnesses_are_stages {Entity : Type} (M : CarlsonModel Entity) (k : Entity) (places : List Entity) (atPred : EntityEntityBool) (h : beEverywhere M.R places atPred k) (p : Entity) :
                            p places (y : Entity), M.R y k atPred y p = true M.sort y = EntitySort.stage

                            Differentiated scope with model constraints: the witnesses at each place are guaranteed to be stages (spatiotemporally bounded entities).

                            theorem Semantics.Lexical.Noun.Kind.Carlson1977.bare_plural_narrow_scope_only {Entity : Type} (P : EntityProp) (c : Entity) :
                            ¬(P c ¬P c)

                            @cite{carlson-1977}'s central argument (§4, sentence 134): bare plurals yield ONLY the contradictory reading under conjunction with negation.

                            "Cats are here and cats aren't here" — whether "be here" is stage-level or individual-level, the bare plural contributes the SAME constant c in both conjuncts. The result is P ∧ ¬P for some P, which is unsatisfiable.

                            This is a consequence of the proper-name analysis: constants force coreference across conjuncts.

                            theorem Semantics.Lexical.Noun.Kind.Carlson1977.bare_plural_stage_level_contradiction {Entity : Type} (R : RealizationRel Entity) (P : EntityBool) (c : Entity) :
                            ¬(stageLevelPred Entity R P c ¬stageLevelPred Entity R P c)

                            Instantiated for stage-level predicates: "Cats are here and cats aren't here" with here as stage-level (via R) is still contradictory.

                            ∃y[R(y,c) ∧ Here'(y)] ∧ ¬∃y[R(y,c) ∧ Here'(y)] = ⊥ 
                            
                            theorem Semantics.Lexical.Noun.Kind.Carlson1977.quantified_np_non_contradictory {Entity : Type} (Cat Here : EntityBool) (c₁ c₂ : Entity) (hCat₁ : Cat c₁ = true) (hHere₁ : Here c₁ = true) (hCat₂ : Cat c₂ = true) (hHere₂ : Here c₂ = false) :
                            ( (x : Entity), Cat x = true Here x = true) (x : Entity), Cat x = true Here x = false

                            Contrast: quantified NPs allow non-contradictory readings because different witnesses can satisfy the two conjuncts.

                            "Some cats are here and some cats aren't here" is satisfiable: one cat can be here while another isn't. We construct an explicit witness showing satisfiability.

                            This is the CONTRAST that makes Carlson's argument: proper names (bare plurals) force contradiction; quantifiers (indefinites) don't. The structural reason is that proper names contribute a constant, while quantifiers introduce a variable that can take different values.

                            theorem Semantics.Lexical.Noun.Kind.Carlson1977.quantified_np_stage_level_non_contradictory {Entity : Type} (Cat : EntityBool) (R : RealizationRel Entity) (P : EntityBool) (c₁ c₂ y₁ : Entity) (hCat₁ : Cat c₁ = true) (hR₁ : R y₁ c₁) (hP₁ : P y₁ = true) (hCat₂ : Cat c₂ = true) (hNoStage : ¬ (y : Entity), R y c₂ P y = true) :
                            ( (x : Entity), Cat x = true stageLevelPred Entity R P x) (x : Entity), Cat x = true ¬stageLevelPred Entity R P x

                            The contrast also holds for stage-level predication via R: "Some cats are here and some cats aren't here" with here as stage-level is satisfiable when different individuals have stages in different locations.

                            Key Examples from @cite{carlson-1977} #

                            Generic readings (individual-level predicates) #

                            Existential readings (stage-level predicates) #

                            Narrow scope (§4, sentence 134) #

                            Differentiated scope (§4, sentence 135c) #

                            Opacity (§4, sentence 132) #