A Unified Analysis of the English Bare Plural #
@cite{carlson-1977}
Linguistics and Philosophy 1(3): 413--457, 1977.
The Core Insight #
Bare plurals are proper names of kinds, which are abstract individuals that can be spatially unbounded. The generic/existential distinction arises from the PREDICATE, not from an ambiguous determiner.
Sorted Ontology (§4) #
@cite{carlson-1977} partitions entities into three sorts:
- Stages: Spatially AND temporally bounded slices (a dog at a time & place)
- Ordinary individuals: Spatially bounded (one place at a time)
- Kinds: Spatially UNbounded (can be "here and there" simultaneously)
The realization relation R connects stages to the individuals/kinds they
realize. R is sorted: its domain is stages, its range is individuals or kinds.
This rules out pathological configurations (kinds realizing kinds, stages of
stages) and is captured formally in CarlsonModel.
Predicate Level #
@cite{milsark-1974} and @cite{siegel-1976} distinguished:
- Stage-level predicates ("states"): hungry, available, in the room
- Individual-level predicates ("properties"): intelligent, tall, a mammal
@cite{carlson-1977} connects this to bare plural interpretation:
- Stage-level predicates → existential reading ("Dogs are in the yard")
- Individual-level predicates → generic reading ("Dogs are intelligent")
The existential comes from the predicate (via R), not from the NP.
Habitual Readings (§4) #
For habitual readings like "Dogs run" in simple present tense, @cite{carlson-1977} treats the habitual as direct kind predication:
"Dogs run" → run'(d)
The habitual is individual/kind-level — run' is predicated directly of the
kind, just like intelligent'. The progressive turns it stage-level:
"Dogs are running" → ∃x[R(x, d) ∧ run'(x)]
Later work (@cite{krifka-etal-1995} and others) introduced a covert GEN operator for habituals, but @cite{carlson-1977} handles them via direct kind predication without any generic quantifier.
Connection to Subsequent Work #
- @cite{chierchia-1998}: Formalizes R as the ∪ operator, adds ∩/∪ kind↔property mapping
- @cite{krifka-2004}: Rejects kinds as basic; bare NPs are properties
- @cite{dayal-2004}: Extends with singular kinds and Meaning Preservation
See Phenomena/Generics/Compare.lean for cross-theory comparison.
The three ontological sorts in @cite{carlson-1977}'s system (§4).
Entities are partitioned into stages, (ordinary) individuals, and kinds. This three-way distinction is the foundation: the realization relation R only connects stages to individuals/kinds, never the reverse.
- stage : EntitySort
- individual : EntitySort
- kind : EntitySort
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A Carlson model: a sorted domain with a typed realization relation R.
The sort constraints on R capture genuine formal content from §4:
R_domain: only stages realize things (R's source is always a stage)R_range: stages realize individuals or kinds (R's target is never a stage)
These constraints rule out pathological models where kinds realize kinds, individuals are stages of other individuals, or R chains through stages.
- sort : Entity → EntitySort
Sort assignment: every entity has exactly one sort.
- R : Entity → Entity → Prop
R(y, x): y is a realization (stage) of x.
- R_domain (y x : Entity) : self.R y x → self.sort y = EntitySort.stage
R's domain is stages: only stages realize anything.
- R_range (y x : Entity) : self.R y x → self.sort x = EntitySort.individual ∨ self.sort x = EntitySort.kind
R's range is individuals or kinds: stages realize persistent entities.
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The realization relation: x R y means "x is a stage/realization of y."
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- Semantics.Lexical.Noun.Kind.Carlson1977.RealizationRel Entity = (Entity → Entity → Prop)
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Stage-level vs individual-level predicate classification.
- Stage-level ("states" in @cite{milsark-1974}): hungry, available, in the room
- Individual-level ("properties"): intelligent, tall, a mammal
This determines whether bare plurals get existential or generic readings.
- stageLevel : PredicateLevel
- individualLevel : PredicateLevel
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Individual-level predicate semantics: direct predication of the kind.
⟦be intelligent⟧ = I'
"Dogs are intelligent" = I'(d) where d is the kind DOGS. No existential quantifier involved.
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- Semantics.Lexical.Noun.Kind.Carlson1977.IndividualLevelPred Entity = (Entity → Bool)
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Stage-level predicate semantics: predication via the R relation.
⟦be in the yard⟧ = λx.∃y[R(y,x) ∧ in-yard'(y)]
"Dogs are in the yard" = ∃y[R(y,d) ∧ in-yard'(y)]
The existential comes from THE PREDICATE, not from the NP. This is why bare plurals get existential readings with stage-level predicates.
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The progressive turns any predicate into stage-level (§4, p. 450).
@cite{carlson-1977}: the progressive has "the function of predicating a verb of a stage, but not of an individual."
- "Dogs run" → run'(d) (habitual — individual-level, direct kind predication)
- "Dogs are running" → ∃x[R(x,d) ∧ run'(x)] (progressive makes it stage-level)
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Generic reading derivation: individual-level predicate + kind.
"Dogs are intelligent"
- ⟦dogs⟧ = d (the kind)
- ⟦be intelligent⟧ = I' (individual-level)
- Composition: I'(d)
Result: A property is directly attributed to the kind.
This also covers habitual readings in @cite{carlson-1977}'s system: "Dogs run" = run'(d), where the habitual is individual/kind-level.
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- Semantics.Lexical.Noun.Kind.Carlson1977.genericDerivation kind pred = pred kind
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Existential reading derivation: stage-level predicate + kind.
"Dogs are in the yard"
- ⟦dogs⟧ = d (the kind)
- ⟦be in the yard⟧ = λx.∃y[R(y,x) ∧ in-yard'(y)] (stage-level)
- Composition: ∃y[R(y,d) ∧ in-yard'(y)]
Result: The predicate introduces existential quantification over stages.
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- Semantics.Lexical.Noun.Kind.Carlson1977.existentialDerivation R kind stagePred = Semantics.Lexical.Noun.Kind.Carlson1977.stageLevelPred Entity R stagePred kind
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@cite{carlson-1977}'s central claim: the bare plural is never ambiguous.
The different "readings" (generic vs existential) arise from:
- The predicate's level (individual vs stage)
- Not from different meanings of the NP
This is why there's no scope ambiguity with bare plurals — they're just proper names, and proper names don't scope.
Bare plural semantics: λP.P{k} (§4, p. 450)
"'Dogs' translates as: λPP{d}."
Just like "Jake" denotes the individual Jake, "dogs" denotes the kind DOGS. No determiner, no quantifier — just a proper name.
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Bare plurals behave like proper names, not quantifiers.
The bare plural "dogs" denotes a fixed entity k. Applying any predicate P to the bare plural just evaluates P at k — no quantificational structure, no scope interaction.
Kinds can't realize anything: only stages are in R's domain.
If k has sort .kind, then R(k, x) is impossible — because R_domain
requires the source to be a stage, and kind ≠ stage.
Individuals can't realize anything either: R's domain is stages only.
R doesn't chain: there are no "stages of stages."
If R(y, x) and R(z, y), then y must be simultaneously:
Sort disjointness gives a contradiction. This means the ontological hierarchy has exactly depth 1: stages realize individuals/kinds, full stop.
Stage-level predication of a kind: the existential witness is a stage.
When P is stage-level and we evaluate stageLevelPred R P k, the witness
y satisfying R(y, k) ∧ P(y) is guaranteed to be a stage by R_domain.
This is a genuine constraint: the thing that "is in the yard" when we
say "Dogs are in the yard" must be a spatiotemporally bounded entity.
Individual-level predication bypasses stages entirely.
When P is individual-level, genericDerivation k P applies P directly
to k. No R relation is involved, so no stage-sorting constraint applies.
"be everywhere" as a stage-level predicate over locations (§4, p. 454).
∀y[Place'(y) → ∃z[R(z,k) ∧ At(z,y)]]
Different places can have different realizations — this is why "Dogs were everywhere" is natural (different dogs in different places) while "A dog was everywhere" is bizarre (same dog everywhere).
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Differentiated scope: for a kind k, "k was everywhere" allows different realizations at each place. The ∃ over stages is INSIDE the ∀ over places.
Differentiated scope with model constraints: the witnesses at each place are guaranteed to be stages (spatiotemporally bounded entities).
@cite{carlson-1977}'s central argument (§4, sentence 134): bare plurals yield ONLY the contradictory reading under conjunction with negation.
"Cats are here and cats aren't here" — whether "be here" is stage-level or individual-level, the bare plural contributes the SAME constant c in both conjuncts. The result is P ∧ ¬P for some P, which is unsatisfiable.
This is a consequence of the proper-name analysis: constants force coreference across conjuncts.
Instantiated for stage-level predicates: "Cats are here and cats
aren't here" with here as stage-level (via R) is still contradictory.
∃y[R(y,c) ∧ Here'(y)] ∧ ¬∃y[R(y,c) ∧ Here'(y)] = ⊥
Contrast: quantified NPs allow non-contradictory readings because different witnesses can satisfy the two conjuncts.
"Some cats are here and some cats aren't here" is satisfiable: one cat can be here while another isn't. We construct an explicit witness showing satisfiability.
This is the CONTRAST that makes Carlson's argument: proper names (bare plurals) force contradiction; quantifiers (indefinites) don't. The structural reason is that proper names contribute a constant, while quantifiers introduce a variable that can take different values.
The contrast also holds for stage-level predication via R:
"Some cats are here and some cats aren't here" with here as
stage-level is satisfiable when different individuals have stages
in different locations.
Key Examples from @cite{carlson-1977} #
Generic readings (individual-level predicates) #
- "Horses are mammals" — mammals'(HORSES) (direct kind predication)
- "Dogs are intelligent" — intelligent'(DOGS) (direct kind predication)
- "Dogs run" — run'(DOGS) (habitual = individual-level kind predication)
Existential readings (stage-level predicates) #
- "Dogs are in the next room" — ∃y[R(y, DOGS) ∧ in-next-room'(y)]
- "Dogs are running" — ∃y[R(y, DOGS) ∧ running'(y)] (progressive = stage-level)
Narrow scope (§4, sentence 134) #
- "Cats are here and cats aren't here" = ∃y[R(y,c) ∧ Here'(y)] ∧ ¬∃y[R(y,c) ∧ Here'(y)] = CONTRADICTION Since "cats" denotes a constant c (not a variable), the two conjuncts are P ∧ ¬P. Contrast with "some cats" where different witnesses can satisfy the two existentials.
Differentiated scope (§4, sentence 135c) #
- "Dogs were everywhere" — ∀y[Place'(y) → ∃z[R(z, DOGS) ∧ At(z,y)]] Natural: different dogs in different places
- "A dog was everywhere" — bizarre: same dog in every place
Opacity (§4, sentence 132) #
- "Max believes dogs are here" = Bel'(^∃y[R(y, d) ∧ Here'(y)])(m) Since d is a kind (no reference to particular dogs), the ∃ is inside the belief — only the opaque reading is available.