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Linglib.Theories.Semantics.Causation.PsychCausalLink

Psych Verb Causal Links #

@cite{kim-2024} @cite{allen-1983} @cite{bach-1986} Formal integration of @cite{kim-2024}'s maintenance relation with existing @cite{lewis-1973} infrastructure: temporal intervals, event sorts, and counterfactual semantics.

Kim's core claim (§3.3): stative Class II psych verbs involve a maintenance causal relation, not eventive causation. The two flavors differ along three dimensions:

PropertyEventiveMaintenance
Cause sortevent (external percept)state (mental representation)
EffectBECOME + state (transition)state only (no transition)
Temporalcause precedes effectcause and effect contemporaneous
Counterfactualeffect persists after cause ceaseseffect ceases with cause

The first three properties are formalized using existing Linglib types: EventSort, Interval.precedes/.overlaps. The fourth uses universalCounterfactualB from Counterfactual.lean.

Key results #

Maintenance is temporally symmetric: if cause overlaps effect, effect overlaps cause. This follows from Interval.overlaps being symmetric.

Eventive causation is temporally irreflexive: no eventuality can precede itself. Follows from Interval.precedes requiring i.finish < i.start, contradicting i.valid : i.start ≤ i.finish.

Precedence and overlap are mutually exclusive: if cause precedes effect, they cannot overlap. This is the structural basis for the eventive/stative dichotomy — the two temporal configurations are incompatible for any given pair of eventualities.

Maintenance involves no transition (no BECOME).

Eventive causation involves a transition (BECOME).

def Semantics.Causation.PsychCausalLink.counterfactuallyDependent {W : Type u_1} [DecidableEq W] (closer : WWWBool) (domain : List W) (causeProp effectProp : WBool) (w : W) :

Counterfactual dependence: in the closest worlds where the cause doesn't hold, the effect doesn't hold either.

¬cause □→ ¬effect

This characterizes maintenance causation (Kim §3.3 property (c)): "The problem concerns John" — in the closest worlds where John no longer has the mental representation, the concern ceases.

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    def Semantics.Causation.PsychCausalLink.counterfactuallyPersistent {W : Type u_1} [DecidableEq W] (closer : WWWBool) (domain : List W) (causeProp effectProp : WBool) (w : W) :

    Counterfactual persistence: in the closest worlds where the cause doesn't hold, the effect STILL holds.

    ¬cause □→ effect

    This characterizes eventive causation: "The noise frightened John" — even if the noise hadn't occurred (in the closest worlds), the frightened state, once established by BECOME, persists independently.

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      theorem Semantics.Causation.PsychCausalLink.dependent_excludes_persistent {W : Type u_1} [DecidableEq W] (closer : WWWBool) (domain : List W) (causeProp effectProp : WBool) (w : W) (hDep : counterfactuallyDependent closer domain causeProp effectProp w = true) (hNonempty : (Conditionals.Counterfactual.closestWorldsB closer domain w (List.filter (fun (w : W) => !causeProp w) domain)).length > 0) :
      counterfactuallyPersistent closer domain causeProp effectProp w = false

      Counterfactual dependence and persistence are mutually exclusive when the set of closest ¬cause worlds is non-empty.

      If all closest ¬cause worlds satisfy ¬effect (dependence), then at least one closest world falsifies effect, so persistence fails.

      TODO: Proof via List.all reasoning — if l.all (fun w => !f w) and l ≠ [], then l.all f = false.

      The three defining properties of maintenance causation from @cite{kim-2024}, formalized using existing infrastructure:

      (a) Relates two eventualities — both are states (EventSort.state) (b) Temporal contemporaneity — Interval.overlaps (c) No transition — effect is a persisting state, not a change

      Property (c) is formalized structurally (no BECOME) rather than via counterfactuals, because the counterfactual characterization ("effect ceases when cause ceases") requires a concrete world space and similarity ordering. The structural version — no BECOME means no independent grounding for the effect — is the deeper explanation for WHY maintenance-caused states are counterfactually dependent.