Symmetric Alternatives #
The symmetry problem is the central challenge for any theory of scalar implicatures based on alternatives. The problem: for any stronger alternative A of an assertion S, the sentence S ∧ ¬A is also stronger than S and yields the opposite implicature. A theory of alternatives must explain why A enters the alternative set but S ∧ ¬A does not.
The problem emerged in the early 1970s: @cite{horn-1972} established the Gricean derivation of scalar implicatures, and @cite{kroch-1972} discussed the same reasoning for quantifiers, creating the conditions for recognizing that symmetric alternatives pose a fundamental obstacle. Every subsequent theory of alternatives is shaped by this problem:
- @cite{katzir-2007} addresses it via structural complexity: S ∧ ¬A is structurally more complex than S, so it is excluded from F(S)
- @cite{fox-2007}'s innocent exclusion correctly handles symmetric alternatives (they land in different MCEs, so neither is in I-E), but the problem of which alternatives enter the set remains
- @cite{fox-katzir-2011} show that contextual restriction cannot break symmetry — only the formal alternative set F can
- @cite{breheny-et-al-2018} show that none of these fully solve the problem (indirect SIs, gradable adjectives, too many/few lexical alternatives remain problematic)
- @cite{fox-spector-2018}'s economy condition constrains where
exhcan be inserted (not vacuous, not weakening), which interacts with symmetry: symmetric alternatives makeexhvacuous (seesymmetric_exhB_vacuous), so economy would block uninformative exhaustification rather than producing wrong results - RSA (@cite{frank-goodman-2012}, @cite{franke-2011}) dissolves
rather than solves the symmetry problem: the utterance space is
specified directly (typically simple lexical items), and utterance
cost penalizes complex expressions like "some but not all." Even
without cost, Bayesian inference at finite rationality α handles
symmetric alternatives gracefully — the symmetry problem only
re-emerges in the categorical limit α → ∞ where RSA collapses
to
exh(seeComparisons.RSANeoGricean)
This file defines the core concepts — isSymmetric, complement
equivalence, and inconsistency of joint exclusion — as theory-neutral
infrastructure that any approach can import. The definition follows
@cite{fox-katzir-2011} definition 12, but the concept is not specific
to that paper.
Key Definitions and Theorems #
isSymmetric: S₁, S₂ partition S's denotation (def 12)symmetric_complement: S ∧ ¬S₁ = S₂ when symmetricboth_excluded_inconsistent: excluding both contradicts Ssymmetric_not_ie: symmetric alternatives are never in I-EexhB_vacuous_of_ie_empty: exhB = identity when I-E is emptysymmetric_exhB_vacuous: exhB is vacuous when only symmetric altsRelevanceClosure: closure under ¬ and ∧ (condition 50)context_cannot_break_symmetry: C preserves symmetry (constraint 28)
Two propositions are symmetric alternatives of S if they partition S's denotation: their union equals S and they are mutually exclusive.
Formalized from @cite{fox-katzir-2011} definition 12. The underlying problem was recognized in the early 1970s (@cite{horn-1972}, @cite{kroch-1972}).
Note: this is stricter than mere non-innocent-excludability. Disjuncts p, q of p∨q are often mutually compatible (p ∩ q ≠ ∅) and hence NOT symmetric, though they still resist innocent exclusion for related reasons (@cite{fox-katzir-2011} fn. 18).
Equations
Instances For
When S₁, S₂ are symmetric alternatives of S, S ∧ ¬S₁ is extensionally equal to S₂. This is the key fact underlying the relevance argument: showing S ∧ ¬S₁ is relevant suffices to show S₂ is relevant.
Excluding both symmetric alternatives is inconsistent with S. If S₁, S₂ partition S, then S ∧ ¬S₁ ∧ ¬S₂ is unsatisfiable: every S-world is an S₁-world or S₂-world (by the union condition) but the exclusion requires it to be neither.
General principle: symmetric alternatives are never innocently excludable. If S₁, S₂ partition S's denotation and both appear in the alternative set, then neither is in I-E.
The argument: since ⟦S₁⟧ ∩ ⟦S₂⟧ = ∅ and ⟦S₁⟧ ∪ ⟦S₂⟧ = ⟦S⟧,
excluding both is unsatisfiable (proved by
both_excluded_inconsistent). So each MCE contains at most
one of {S₁, S₂}. Since each can be consistently excluded
individually (witnessed by an S₂-world or S₁-world respectively),
each appears in some MCE but not all. Hence neither is in
I-E = ⋂MCEs.
The proof establishes that {i₂} is a consistent exclusion set
(using sym_witness), extends it to a maximal consistent exclusion
(via exists_maximal_extension), and observes that this MCE
cannot contain i₁ (by both_excluded_inconsistent). The
symmetric argument shows an MCE containing i₁ but not i₂.
When ieIndices returns the empty list, exhB reduces to the
prejacent — no alternatives are excluded.
Vacuity corollary: when the symmetric pair are the only
non-weaker alternatives, exhB is the identity —
exhaustification is vacuous.
This is the general principle underlying the concrete
FoxKatzir2011.symmetry_problem: with both symmetric
alternatives present and no other non-weaker alternatives,
I-E is empty, so exh does nothing.
Context Cannot Break Symmetry #
The set of contextually relevant sentences C must satisfy closure conditions (@cite{fox-katzir-2011} condition 50):
(50a) If S is relevant, so is ¬S. (50b) If S₁, S₂ are relevant, so is S₁ ∧ S₂.
From these conditions, constraint (28) follows: symmetry cannot be
broken in C. If S₁ is relevant and S is relevant, then S ∧ ¬S₁ is
relevant (by 50a + 50b). But when S₁, S₂ are symmetric, S ∧ ¬S₁ ≡ S₂
(by symmetric_complement). So S₂ is also relevant, and contextual
restriction cannot selectively eliminate one symmetric alternative
while keeping the other.
Closure conditions on relevance (condition 50).
Instances For
C cannot break symmetry (constraint 28): if S₁ is relevant
and S is relevant, then the symmetric partner S ∧ ¬S₁ (which
equals S₂ when S₁, S₂ are symmetric by symmetric_complement)
is also relevant.
Therefore any contextual restriction that keeps S₁ must also keep S₂. Symmetry breaking must happen in F, not in C.