@cite{khoo-2015}: Modal Disagreements #
Empirical data from Khoo's experiment on epistemic modal disagreements. The key finding: speakers reject might-claims (high rejection rating) without judging them false (low falsity rating). This dissociation between rejection and falsity judgments is predicted by @cite{rudin-2025}'s Neo-Stalnakerian Framework, which derives it from the fact that truth depends on the assertor's information while rejection depends on the rejector's information.
Experimental Design (§II) #
- N = 60 participants on Amazon Mechanical Turk
- 2 × 2 mixed design: between-subjects on response type (False vs Rejection), within-subjects on sentence type (Control vs Modal)
- 7-point Likert scale (1 = completely disagree, 7 = completely agree)
- Control vignette: non-modal assertion ("Jim is at home right now")
- Modal vignette: epistemic might ("Fat Tony might be dead")
- False condition: "Do you agree that what [speaker] said is false?"
- Rejection condition: "Would you respond by saying 'No,...'?"
Key Finding: The Difference Observation (footnote 13) #
When presented with Modal, ordinary speakers are strongly inclined to reject Smith's assertion (M = 5.03) but are also strongly inclined to disagree that what Smith said is false (M = 2.42). This dissociation is absent in Control, where rejection and falsity ratings are similar.
The interaction is the core result: the rejection–falsity gap reverses direction between Modal (rejection ≫ falsity) and Control (falsity ≥ rejection).
Experimental Conditions #
Sentence type: control (non-modal) vs modal (epistemic might).
- control : SentenceType
- modal : SentenceType
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Response type: falsity judgment vs rejection inclination.
- false_ : ResponseType
- rejection : ResponseType
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An experimental condition is a sentence × response pair.
- sentence : SentenceType
- response : ResponseType
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Mean Likert rating for each condition.
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Standard deviation for each condition.
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The Difference Observation #
The crucial finding: for modal sentences, rejection is high but falsity is low. For control sentences, both are high.
Modal rejection is high (above midpoint 4).
Modal falsity is low (below midpoint 4).
The dissociation: modal rejection exceeds modal falsity.
Control shows no dissociation: falsity ≥ rejection.
The rejection–falsity gap is large for modal (> 2 points).
The rejection–falsity gap is small for control (< 1 point).
The interaction: the rejection–falsity gap reverses direction between Modal and Control. For Modal, rejection exceeds falsity; for Control, falsity exceeds rejection. This is Khoo's "Difference Observation."
The Mobster scenario has the structure predicted by the NSF: Smith (assertor) has examined evidence consistent with Fat Tony being dead, so his epistemic state contains p-worlds (p = "Fat Tony is dead"). Beth (rejector) knows Fat Tony is alive, so her epistemic state has no p-worlds.
The NSF predicts:
- Smith's assertion is true (his state is in MI(might-p))
- Beth's rejection is licensed (her state is not might-p-compatible)
This matches Khoo's finding: speakers reject the might-claim without judging it false.