Epistemic Contradictions — Empirical Data #
@cite{holliday-mandelkern-2024}
Theory-neutral observations about epistemic contradictions. These are the empirical facts that any semantic theory of epistemic modals must account for.
Three kinds of contradiction #
- Moore sentences: "It's raining but I don't know that it's raining." Pragmatically odd but embeddable (under "suppose", in conditionals, etc.).
- Wittgenstein sentences: "It's raining and it might not be raining." Semantically contradictory — infelicitous even under embedding.
- Classical contradictions: "It's raining and it's not raining." Logically contradictory — always infelicitous.
The key datum: Wittgenstein sentences pattern with classical contradictions (not with Moore sentences) under embedding, suggesting they are semantic contradictions, not merely pragmatic ones.
A sentence type: how epistemic modality interacts with assertion.
- moore : SentenceType
- wittgenstein : SentenceType
- classical : SentenceType
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Embedding environments that distinguish Moore from Wittgenstein.
- suppose : EmbeddingEnv
- conditional : EmbeddingEnv
- epistemic : EmbeddingEnv
- disjunction : EmbeddingEnv
- attitude : EmbeddingEnv
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Moore sentences become felicitous under embedding; Wittgenstein and classical contradictions remain infelicitous. This is the core diagnostic separating pragmatic from semantic contradiction.
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- Phenomena.Modality.EpistemicContradictions.felicitousUnderEmbedding Phenomena.Modality.EpistemicContradictions.SentenceType.moore = true
- Phenomena.Modality.EpistemicContradictions.felicitousUnderEmbedding Phenomena.Modality.EpistemicContradictions.SentenceType.wittgenstein = false
- Phenomena.Modality.EpistemicContradictions.felicitousUnderEmbedding Phenomena.Modality.EpistemicContradictions.SentenceType.classical = false
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"Sue might be the winner and she might not be, and either she is or she isn't" is fine; distributing yields two Wittgenstein sentences joined by "or", which is not.
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The argument "either the dog is inside or it must be outside; it's not the case that it must be outside; therefore the dog is inside" is intuitively invalid for epistemic modals.
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