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Linglib.Phenomena.Complementation.Studies.ChatzikyriakidisEtAl2025

Intentional Identity Bridge @cite{chatzikyriakidis-etal-2025} #

@cite{cooper-2023} @cite{geach-1967}

TTR solution to Geach's intentional identity puzzle.

The problem #

"Hob thinks a witch has blighted Bob's mare, and Nob wonders whether she killed Cob's sow."

In possible-worlds semantics, the pronoun "she" needs a referent, but the witch need not exist, and Hob and Nob may not share a doxastic alternative. There is no entity in the model to serve as the antecedent.

The TTR solution #

In TTR (@cite{cooper-2023}, @cite{chatzikyriakidis-etal-2025} §2), the solution uses types rather than entities as the locus of identity:

  1. Hob's belief state contains a type T_witch (a predicate type "witch who blighted Bob's mare") — this type can be inhabited or empty
  2. Nob's wonder state references the same type T_witch
  3. Intentional identity = both agents' attitudes involve the same IType (intensional type), not the same individual entity
  4. The type can be empty (no witch exists) — IsFalse T_witch is fine

The key: TTR types are intensional objects that can be shared across attitude contexts without requiring witnesses. Two agents can think "about the same witch-type" without any witch existing.

TTR model of the Hob-Nob puzzle #

Agents in the Hob-Nob scenario.

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      Entities in the scenario (Bob's mare, Cob's sow).

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          The shared witch type: an intentional type that both agents' attitudes reference. This is the key to the TTR solution — the type exists as an intensional object even when empty.

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            Hob's belief content: the witch type applied to Bob's mare. "A witch has blighted Bob's mare" ≈ [x : Witch, e : blight(x, bobsMare)]. We model this as a dependent record type.

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              Nob's wondering content: the witch type applied to Cob's sow. "She killed Cob's sow" ≈ [x : Witch, e : kill(x, cobsSow)]. Crucially, "she" refers to the SAME witch type.

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                The witch type is shared: both attitudes reference the same IType. This is intentional identity — agreement at the type level, not at the entity level.

                The witch need not exist — the type can be empty. This is what possible-worlds semantics cannot express: both agents have attitudes "about" an empty type.

                Despite non-existence, both belief structures are well-defined types. They are empty types (no witnesses), but they are valid TTR types.

                The intentional identity is structural: both record types depend on the same witchType.carrier field. Changing the witch type in one attitude changes it in both — they are linked by type sharing, not by coreference to an entity.

                Contrast with possible-worlds approach #

                In Prop' W, there's no way to distinguish "Hob thinks p" from "Hob thinks q" when p and q are the same set of worlds. The intensional identity of the witch type is lost.

                theorem Phenomena.Complementation.Attitudes.IntentionalIdentity.Bridge.intensional_distinction_enables_ii :
                witchType.extEquiv { carrier := Empty, name := "ghost_who_haunts" } ¬witchType.intEq { carrier := Empty, name := "ghost_who_haunts" }

                Two ITypes can share the same (empty) carrier but differ intensionally. This is why TTR can handle intentional identity but Prop' W cannot: it distinguishes types by identity, not just extension.