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Linglib.Phenomena.Clarification.Basic

Clarification: When to Ask vs. When to Act #

@cite{raiffa-schlaifer-1961}

When agents face uncertainty about an interlocutor's goals, they choose between acting under uncertainty and asking clarification questions (CQs). Both @cite{tsvilodub-etal-2026} and @cite{dong-etal-2026} find that this choice is governed by the expected value of perfect information (EVPI): agents clarify when EVPI exceeds communication cost.

EVPI captures the interaction of uncertainty and stakes — it is high when (a) uncertainty is high AND (b) acting incorrectly is costly. This interaction is the core empirical finding shared by both papers.

Connection to existing infrastructure #

EVPI is the maximum possible questionUtility (@cite{van-rooy-2003}): it equals questionUtility on the identity partition, where each world is its own cell. Any specific clarification question yields at most EVPI.

def Phenomena.Clarification.bestUtilityAt {W : Type u_1} {A : Type u_2} (dp : Core.DecisionTheory.DecisionProblem W A) (actions : Finset A) (w : W) :

Maximum utility achievable at world w across actions.

With Finset actions, this is sup' over utilities at world w.

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    Oracle value: expected utility under perfect information. Σ_w P(w) · max_a U(w, a)

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      Expected value of perfect information (EVPI).

      EVPI = oracleValue − dpValue = Σ_w P(w) · max_a U(w,a) − max_a Σ_w P(w) · U(w,a)

      Equivalently, the expected regret of the current best action (@cite{tsvilodub-etal-2026}), or the upper bound on VoI for any question (@cite{dong-etal-2026}).

      @cite{raiffa-schlaifer-1961}

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        theorem Phenomena.Clarification.evpi_nonneg {W : Type u_1} {A : Type u_2} [Fintype W] [DecidableEq W] (dp : Core.DecisionTheory.DecisionProblem W A) (actions : Finset A) (hprior : ∀ (w : W), 0 dp.prior w) (hne : actions.Nonempty) :
        0 evpi dp actions

        EVPI is non-negative: acting with perfect information is at least as good as acting without.

        Proof sketch: For each action a, its expected utility EU(a) equals Σ_w P(w) · U(w,a). The oracle value Σ_w P(w) · max_a' U(w,a') is pointwise ≥ Σ_w P(w) · U(w,a) since max_a' U(w,a') ≥ U(w,a). Therefore oracleValue ≥ EU(a) for every a, hence oracleValue ≥ max_a EU(a) = dpValue.