Assertion Theories: Cross-Theory Comparison #
@cite{brandom-1994} @cite{farkas-bruce-2010} @cite{gunlogson-2001} @cite{krifka-2015} @cite{lauer-2013} @cite{stalnaker-1978}
Compares six theories of assertion along structural dimensions: Stalnaker, Farkas & Bruce, Krifka, Brandom, Gunlogson, and Lauer.
Comparison Matrix #
| Theory | Commitment ≠ Belief | Retraction | Source | Entitlements | Probabilistic |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Stalnaker | No | No | No | No | No |
| F&B | Yes | No | No | No | No |
| Krifka | Yes | Yes | No | No | No |
| Brandom | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | No |
| Gunlogson | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | No |
| Lauer | Yes | No | No | No | Yes |
Key Embeddings #
- Stalnaker embeds in Krifka: when commitment = belief (no lying, no hedging), Krifka's model collapses to Stalnaker's.
- F&B's dcS/dcL are Krifka commitment states: dcS = speaker's commitment slate, dcL = addressee's commitment slate.
- Brandom strictly richer than Stalnaker: entitlements have no Stalnaker analog.
- Gunlogson models rising declaratives; Stalnaker cannot.
- Lying: Krifka and Brandom handle it (commitment without belief); Stalnaker struggles (assertion = belief update).
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The full comparison matrix.
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The matrix agrees with the interface flags.