Spector 2025: Trivalence and Transparency #
@cite{spector-2025}
A non-dynamic approach to anaphora combining trivalent semantics (Middle Kleene, @cite{peters-1979}, @cite{beaver-krahmer-2001}) with Schlenker's Transparency Principle (@cite{schlenker-2007}, @cite{schlenker-2008a}).
Key Results Formalized #
Forward anaphora in conjunction (§3.2):
∃xT(x) ∧ P(x̲)satisfies Transparency — the free variable in the second conjunct is licensed by the existential in the first.Reverse conjunction fails (§3.2):
P(x̲) ∧ ∃xT(x)does NOT satisfy Transparency in the null context — cataphora across conjunction is correctly predicted to be infelicitous.Bathroom sentences (§3.3):
¬∃xB(x) ∨ H(x̲)satisfies Transparency — the classic "either there's no bathroom or it's upstairs" pattern is correctly predicted to be felicitous.Reverse bathroom fails (§3.3):
H(x̲) ∨ ¬∃xB(x)does NOT satisfy Transparency in the null context.Semantic adequacy: The trivalent semantics delivers the correct truth-at-a-world conditions (§2.1).
Note on Middle Kleene conjunction #
The paper's Table 1 shows 0 ∧ # = # for conjunction, but the paper's
text (§2.1) states: "If φ is not undefined, then the truth values of
φ ∧ ψ are the same as in the Strong Kleene truth-tables." Strong Kleene
gives false ∧ # = false. The §3.2 proofs depend on this: the reverse
conjunction counterexample requires meetMiddle false # = false. We
follow the text and the proofs (Table 1 appears to contain an error
in the conjunction column for 0 ∧ #).
Architecture #
The trivalent semantics uses partial assignments (PartialAssign D)
and plural assignments (PluralAssign D) from Core.Assignment.
Predicate application yields # when the variable is unvalued.
The existential quantifier uses @cite{mandelkern-2022}'s witness
condition: ∃xφ is true at (w,g) only if g(x) witnesses φ,
undefined if classically true but g(x) is not a witness.
Interpretation function: maps predicates to extensions at worlds.
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- Phenomena.Anaphora.Studies.Spector2025.Interp W D = (W → D → Bool)
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Evaluate a one-place predicate on a partial assignment. §2.1:
1ifg(x) ∈ I(P,w)0ifg(x) ≠ #andg(x) ∉ I(P,w)#ifg(x) = #
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- Phenomena.Anaphora.Studies.Spector2025.evalPred I g x w = match g x with | some d => Core.Duality.Truth3.ofBool (I w d) | none => Core.Duality.Truth3.indet
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The U(x) predicate as a Truth3 value.
Always bivalent: true if valued, false if not.
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U(x) is never undefined.
When g does not value x, evaluating a predicate at x is undefined.
A sentence φ is true at a world w iff there is an assignment g such that ⟦φ⟧^{w,g} = 1.
§2.1: "A sentence φ is true at a world w if and only if there is an assignment function g such that ⟦φ⟧^{w,g} = 1." This bridges trivalent assignment-level semantics to world-level truth conditions.
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Parametric Transparency #
§6.3 observes that the Transparency proofs are
parametric in the assignment type — the same Middle Kleene reasoning
works for individual assignments g and plural assignments G.
We factor this out: the proofs below are stated over abstract Truth3
values, independent of assignment representation.
Parametric forward conjunction Transparency: meetMiddle E (meetMiddle presup φ) = meetMiddle E φ whenever E = true → presup = true. Independent of
assignment type — works for both individual and plural systems.
§3.2, §6.3: The three cases are:
E = false:meetMiddle false _ = false(left zero)E = #:meetMiddle # _ = #(left absorbs)E = true: witness givespresup = true, someetMiddle true φ = φ
Parametric bathroom Transparency: joinMiddle negE (meetMiddle presup φ) = joinMiddle negE φ whenever negE = false → presup = true.
Forward anaphora: ∃xT(x) ∧ P(x̲) #
Consider "A table is in the room and it is purple," translated as
∃xT(x) ∧ P(x̲). The Transparency question is: does
∃xT(x) ∧ (U(x) ∧ φ) always have the same truth value as
∃xT(x) ∧ φ?
The frame is F(ψ) = ∃xT(x) ∧ ψ, and the presupposition is U(x).
Proof (§3.2): Consider (w,g).
- If
∃xT(x)is false at(w,g): both sentences are false (Middle Kleene:false ∧ _ = false). - If
∃xT(x)is#at(w,g): both sentences are#(Middle Kleene:# ∧ _ = #). - If
∃xT(x)is true at(w,g): thengvaluesx, soU(x) = true, someetMiddle true φ = φ, so both sentences equal∃xT(x) ∧ φ.
Forward conjunction Transparency: ∃xT(x) ∧ P(x̲) satisfies
Transparency in every context.
§3.2: The abstract pattern is: if E = true
implies presup = true (the witness connection), then the frame
F(ψ) = meetMiddle E ψ satisfies Transparency for presup.
Derived from conj_transparency_parametric.
Reverse conjunction Transparency FAILS: P(x̲) ∧ ∃xT(x) does NOT
satisfy Transparency in the null context.
§3.2: Take φ = P(x). If g does not value x,
then φ ∧ ∃xT(x) is # (left undefined absorbs), but
(U(x) ∧ φ) ∧ ∃xT(x) is false ∧ ∃xT(x) = false (since U(x) = false
and meetMiddle false # = false). The key asymmetry of Middle Kleene:
meetMiddle false # = false but meetMiddle # _ = #.
Bathroom sentences: ¬∃xB(x) ∨ H(x̲) #
"Either there is no bathroom, or it is hidden," translated as
¬∃xB(x) ∨ H(x̲). The Transparency question is: does
¬∃xB(x) ∨ (U(x) ∧ φ) always have the same truth value as
¬∃xB(x) ∨ φ?
The frame is F(ψ) = joinMiddle (¬∃xB(x)) ψ, and the presupposition
is U(x).
Proof (§3.3): Consider (w,g).
- If
¬∃xB(x)is true at(w,g):joinMiddle true _ = true(SK). - If
¬∃xB(x)is#at(w,g):joinMiddle # _ = #(left absorbs). - If
¬∃xB(x)is false at(w,g): then∃xB(x)is true, sogvaluesx, soU(x) = true, someetMiddle true φ = φ, and both disjunctions reduce tojoinMiddle false φ.
Bathroom sentence Transparency: ¬∃xB(x) ∨ H(x̲) satisfies
Transparency in every context.
The key insight: ¬E being false means E is true, which (by the
witness condition) means g values x, making U(x) redundant.
Derived from disj_transparency_parametric.
Reverse bathroom Transparency FAILS: H(x̲) ∨ ¬∃xB(x) does NOT
satisfy Transparency in the null context.
§3.3: Consider g that does not value x and a
tautological φ. Then φ ∨ ¬∃xB(x) has φ = # (unvalued), so
joinMiddle # (¬∃xB(x)) = #. But (U(x) ∧ φ) ∨ ¬∃xB(x) has
U(x) = false, so meetMiddle false # = false, and
joinMiddle false (¬∃xB(x)) can be true — a difference.
Bathroom truth-condition equivalence #
§2.1 proves that the trivalent sentence
¬∃xB(x) ∨ F(x) is true at a world w (in the sense of
definition (6): ∃g such that the sentence is .true at (w,g))
if and only if the classical sentence ¬∃xB(x) ∨ ∃x(B(x) ∧ F(x))
is true at w.
This is the key semantic adequacy result: the trivalent system delivers the correct truth conditions, not just correct felicity predictions.
Proof outline (two directions):
(8) classically true → (7) true at some (w,g):
- Case 1:
∃xB(x)classically false. Then for everyg,∃xB(x)is false at(w,g), so¬∃xB(x)is true, andjoinMiddle true _ = true. - Case 2:
∃x(B(x) ∧ F(x))classically true. Pick witnessa, setg(x) = a. Then¬∃xB(x)is false (sinceg(x) = awitnessesB), andF(x)is true. SojoinMiddle false true = true.
(7) true at some (w,g) → (8) classically true:
- By Middle Kleene disjunction, either
¬∃xB(x)is true at(w,g)(→∃xB(x)classically false → first disjunct of (8)), or¬∃xB(x)is false andF(x)is true. In the latter case,∃xB(x)is true sog(x) ∈ I(B,w), andF(x)true meansg(x) ∈ I(F,w), sog(x)witnessesB(x) ∧ F(x).
The trivalent sentence ¬∃xB(x) ∨ F(x) evaluated at (w,g),
where B and F are one-place predicates and x is variable 0.
Components:
∃xB(x): true ifg(0) ∈ I(B,w), false if∀d, d ∉ I(B,w),#if classically true butg(0)not a witness¬∃xB(x): negation (flips true/false, preserves#)F(x):evalPred F g 0 w(true/false/#depending ong(0))- Overall:
joinMiddle (neg (∃xB(x))) (F(x))
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- One or more equations did not get rendered due to their size.
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Classical truth of ¬∃xB(x) ∨ ∃x(B(x) ∧ F(x)): either no element
satisfies B, or some element satisfies both B and F.
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Direction 1: If the classical bathroom disjunction holds,
then the trivalent sentence is true at w.
§2.1: We construct a specific g that
makes the trivalent sentence .true.
- If no bathrooms exist: any
gworks (¬∃xB(x) is true,joinMiddle true _ = true). - If a bathroom
aexists withF(a): setg(0) = a. Then ¬∃xB(x) is false (a witnesses B), F(x) = F(a) = true, andjoinMiddle false true = true.
Direction 2: If the trivalent bathroom sentence is true at w,
then the classical disjunction holds.
§2.1: By Middle Kleene disjunction, the sentence
is .true at (w,g) only if either:
(a) ¬∃xB(x) is .true → ∃xB(x) is .false → no bathrooms, or
(b) ¬∃xB(x) is .false and F(x) is .true. In case (b),
∃xB(x) is .true, so g(0) ∈ I(B,w) (witness condition),
and F(x) = true means g(0) ∈ I(F,w). So g(0) witnesses
B(x) ∧ F(x).
Requires dom to list all elements of D (completeness).
Bathroom truth-condition equivalence (the complete iff).
§2.1: The trivalent sentence ¬∃xB(x) ∨ F(x)
is true at world w if and only if the classical sentence
¬∃xB(x) ∨ ∃x(B(x) ∧ F(x)) is classically true at w.
This is the key semantic adequacy result: the non-standard trivalent semantics with partial assignments delivers exactly the classical truth conditions for bathroom sentences.
A bare pronoun P(x̲) is infelicitous in the null context.
§3.1: In the null context, Transparency requires
that for every φ, U(x) ∧ φ and φ have the same truth value
across all (w,g). But take g with g(x) = # and φ always true:
meetMiddle false true = false ≠ true, so Transparency fails.
The identity frame F(ψ) = ψ represents a bare sentence.
The Geach donkey sentence reports a bound reading — forward conjunction
∃xP(x) ∧ Q(x̲) is exactly this pattern. Spector's system predicts it
is felicitous via forward_conj_transparency.
Conditional donkey (If a farmer owns a donkey, he beats it) also
has a bound reading. In Spector's system, the conditional is
¬∃xF(x) ∨ B(x̲) — the bathroom sentence pattern.
The classic bathroom sentence is felicitous. Spector's system
predicts this via bathroom_transparency: the frame
F(ψ) = joinMiddle (¬∃xB(x)) ψ satisfies Transparency
because ¬∃xB(x) = false implies ∃xB(x) = true implies
g values x.
Standard negation across sentence boundary is infelicitous — consistent with Transparency failing for bare pronouns.
Conjunction doesn't license bathroom-pattern anaphora (wrong
connective). Spector's system handles this: conjunction uses
meetMiddle, not joinMiddle, so the mechanism is different.
Wrong-order bathroom sentence is infelicitous. This corresponds to
reverse_bathroom_transparency_fails: H(x̲) ∨ ¬∃xB(x) fails
Transparency because H(x̲) is in left position, and Middle Kleene
left-absorbs #.
Summary: Spector's Transparency predictions align with all felicity judgments in the bathroom sentence dataset. Felicitous examples have the presupposition in the RIGHT disjunct (after the negated existential); infelicitous examples violate this pattern.
The plural assignment system #
The preliminary system (§§2–5) fails on covariation: ¬∃x¬∃yS(x,y)
("everybody spoke to somebody") wrongly requires a single person
everyone spoke to. The full system (§6) replaces individual partial
assignments with plural assignments — sets of atomic assignments.
Key changes from the simplified system:
- Evaluation is relative to
(w, G)whereG : PluralAssign D U(x)is replaced byatomic(x):|G(x)| = 1(all assignments inGthat definexagree on its value)- The universal quantifier
∀xφis now well-defined - Quantificational subordination works via inter-variable dependencies
recorded in
G
Plural sentence: evaluated relative to a world and a plural assignment.
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Alias for PluralAssign.singularAt — G assigns x uniquely to d.
§6.2: |G(x)| = 1 with G(x) = d.
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Evaluate a one-place predicate relative to (w, G).
§6.2:
1if|G(x)| = 1andG(x) ∈ I(P,w)0if|G(x)| = 1andG(x) ∉ I(P,w)#if|G(x)| ≠ 1
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The atomic(x) predicate as a Truth3 value.
§6.3: ⟦atomic(x)⟧^{w,G} = 1 if |G(x)| = 1,
0 otherwise. Always bivalent (never #). Replaces U(x) from
the simplified system.
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atomic(x) is always defined (bivalent).
Plural existential quantifier with witness condition. §6.2:
1if⟦φ⟧^{w,G} = 10if for every atomica ∈ D,G_{x=a} ≠ ∅and⟦φ⟧^{w,G_{x=a}} = 0#otherwise
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- One or more equations did not get rendered due to their size.
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Plural universal quantifier. §6.2:
1if for every atomica ∈ D,G_{x=a} ≠ ∅and⟦φ⟧^{w,G_{x=a}} = 10if the coverage condition holds and someagives⟦φ⟧^{w,G_{x=a}} = 0#otherwise
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Forward conjunction Transparency in the plural system, derived from the parametric version.
Bathroom Transparency in the plural system, derived from the parametric version.
Universal doesn't introduce a discourse referent #
§6.3 (pp.20–21): ∀xP(x) ∧ Q(x̲) does NOT
satisfy Transparency in the null context. When ∀xP(x) is true
at (w,G), G(x) contains all atomic individuals in D, so
|G(x)| ≠ 1 (assuming |D| ≥ 2), and therefore atomic(x) is
false. This means the universal quantifier cannot serve as the
antecedent of a singular pronoun.
The universal quantifier does not license subsequent singular
anaphora. For two-element domains: ∀xP(x) being true forces
|G(x)| > 1, making atomic(x) false.
§6.3: the sentences ∀xP(x) ∧ (atomic(x) ∧ φ)
and ∀xP(x) ∧ φ can differ — taking φ tautological, the first
is false (since atomic(x) is false when |G(x)| > 1) while
the second is true.
The covariation problem and its fix #
§5: In the simplified (individual-assignment) system,
¬∃x¬∃yS(x,y) ("everybody spoke to somebody") is true at (w,g) iff
for all a, (a, g(y)) ∈ I(S,w). This wrongly gives a constant-witness
reading: "everyone spoke to g(y)" — a single person.
§6.4: With plural assignments, the innermost ∃y
is evaluated relative to G_{x=a} for each a, so different a's can
pair with different b's. The sentence now correctly means
"for every a there exists b such that (a,b) ∈ S."
The covariation fix: with plural assignments, the universal-existential pattern is correctly expressible.
§6.4: If a world satisfies ∀x∃y S(x,y), we can
build a plural assignment G that witnesses each a-b pair
independently. This is impossible with individual assignments, where
a single g(y) must work for all values of x.
In contrast, with individual assignments the covariation reading fails:
a single assignment can only provide one witness for y, which must
work for ALL values of x.
Two notions of truth at a world #
§7: Two modes of interpretation for donkey sentences:
Weak Truth:
Sis weakly true atwif ∃G such thatSis true at(w,G). Generates existential (weak) readings.Strong Truth:
Sis strongly true atwif ∃G true at(w,G)AND noG'makesSfalse at(w,G'). Generates universal (strong) readings. Similar to @cite{elliott-2023}'s strengthened reading and @cite{champollion-bumford-henderson-2019}'s homogeneity approach.
For simple existentials ∃xP(x), weak and strong truth coincide.
They diverge for donkey sentences.
Weak truth at a world: ∃G such that the sentence is true at (w,G). §7 (46a).
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Strong truth at a world: weakly true AND not weakly false. §7 (46b).
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- Phenomena.Anaphora.Studies.Spector2025.strongTruthP φ w = ((∃ (G : Core.PluralAssign D), φ w G = Core.Duality.Truth3.true) ∧ ¬∃ (G : Core.PluralAssign D), φ w G = Core.Duality.Truth3.false)
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Strong truth implies weak truth.
Connection to donkey reading data: Spector's system predicts weak readings by default (via Weak Truth).
The system also allows strong readings via Strong Truth.
@cite{kanazawa-1994}'s generalization: reading preference tracks quantifier monotonicity. The negated donkey has only strong readings (universal reading when the pronoun is in a DE context).
The Strong Truth Operator #
§7 (55): The operator O internalizes Strong Truth
as an embeddable operator in the object language:
⟦O(S)⟧^{w,G} = 1 if ⟦S⟧^{w,G} = 1 and ¬∃G'. ⟦S⟧^{w,G'} = 0
⟦O(S)⟧^{w,G} = 0 if ⟦S⟧^{w,G} = 0 and ¬∃G'. ⟦S⟧^{w,G'} = 1
⟦O(S)⟧^{w,G} = # otherwise
This allows Strong Truth to be applied at specific syntactic positions rather than globally. Key properties:
- If S₁ ≡ S₂ (logically equivalent), then O(S₁) ≡ O(S₂)
- O can violate Transparency when embedded, which is desirable:
∃xS(x) ∧ O(H(x̲))is correctly predicted to be infelicitous
The Strong Truth Operator O. §7 (55).
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O preserves logical equivalence: if φ₁ and φ₂ agree everywhere, O(φ₁) and O(φ₂) agree everywhere. §7 (57).
O(S) is true at (w,G) implies S is true at (w,G).
Strong truth at w ↔ weak truth of O(S) at w. Embedding O at matrix level recovers the Strong Truth interpretation.
Spector's static system vs. Dynamic Predicate Logic #
positions the system as a non-dynamic alternative to DPL (@cite{groenendijk-stokhof-1991}). Key comparison:
| Phenomenon | Spector | DPL |
|---|---|---|
Forward conj ∃xP(x) ∧ Q(x) | ✓ Transparency | ✓ assignment persistence |
Reverse conj Q(x) ∧ ∃xP(x) | ✗ Middle Kleene | ✗ x not yet bound |
Bathroom ¬∃xB(x) ∨ F(x) | ✓ Transparency | ✗ negation is test |
Neg blocks ¬∃xP(x). Q(x) | ✗ no frame | ✗ negation is test |
The systems agree on 3/4 cases. The disagreement on bathroom sentences is significant: standard DPL cannot handle them because negation is a test that doesn't export assignments (@cite{krahmer-muskens-1996}), while Spector's Transparency-based approach handles them naturally via Middle Kleene disjunction.
Spector handles bathroom sentences; standard DPL does not.
Middle Kleene disjunction + Transparency handles ¬∃xB(x) ∨ F(x̲)
without any dynamic mechanism — the key empirical advantage.
Both systems correctly block cataphora (reverse conjunction).