Normality Orderings #
@cite{kraus-magidor-1990} @cite{veltman-1996} @cite{rudin-2025}
A normality ordering is a preorder on worlds encoding relative normalcy. This structure appears in four places across formal semantics:
- @cite{kratzer-1981}: ordering sources induce normality orderings
for modal semantics (
Theories/Semantics/Modality/Kratzer.lean) - @cite{kraus-magidor-1990}: plausibility orderings interpret
default consequence, System P (
Core/Logic/BeliefRevision.lean) - @cite{veltman-1996}: expectation patterns are normality orderings that
get dynamically refined (
Theories/Semantics/Dynamic/UpdateSemantics/) - @cite{rudin-2025}: ordering-source updates for epistemic modals
(
Theories/Semantics/Dynamic/Epistemic/)
This module extracts the common mathematical core. The PlausibilityOrder
in BeliefRevision.lean adds a smoothness condition (every satisfiable
proposition has minimal elements); for finite types smoothness is automatic,
and NormalityOrder captures the shared preorder structure without it.
Key definitions #
NormalityOrder W: preorder on worlds (reflexive, transitive)optimal: most normal worlds in a domainrefine: promote φ-worlds — @cite{veltman-1996}'s key operationconnected: every two worlds are comparable (totality)fromProps: construct from ordering source — @cite{kratzer-1981}'s patternrespects/ persistence: defaults survive further updates
Extensionality: two normality orderings are equal iff they agree on
all pairs. Uses propext and funext.
An ordering is connected (total) if every two worlds are comparable: for all w, v, either w ≤ v or v ≤ w.
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The total ordering: all worlds equally normal. This is the initial state before any defaults have been processed.
Equations
- Core.Order.NormalityOrder.total = { le := fun (x x_1 : W) => True, le_refl := ⋯, le_trans := ⋯ }
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Optimal (most normal) worlds in a domain: those with no strictly more normal world in the domain.
Equivalent to PlausibilityOrder.minimal in BeliefRevision.lean
and to @cite{veltman-1996}'s opt_ε(σ).
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Optimal worlds are in the domain.
The total ordering is connected.
Refinement: promote φ-worlds in the normality ordering.
After refine no φ, a non-φ-world can no longer be as normal as a
φ-world: w ≤' v iff (w ≤ v) ∧ (φ v → φ w).
This is @cite{veltman-1996}'s key operation. "Normally φ" updates the expectation pattern by intersecting with {⟨w,v⟩ : φ v → φ w}.
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Refinement strengthens: the refined ordering implies the original.
After refinement by φ, a non-φ-world cannot be as normal as a φ-world.
After refinement, if v was ≤ w and v is a φ-world while w is not, then v strictly dominates w.
An ordering respects φ if it already promotes φ-worlds: whenever w ≤ v and v satisfies φ, then w satisfies φ too.
This captures @cite{veltman-1996}'s notion of "accepting" a default: σ accepts "normally φ" iff σ's pattern already respects φ.
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Refinement by φ always produces an ordering that respects φ.
Persistence: if an ordering respects φ, further refinement by any ψ still respects φ. Defaults are not undone by later defaults.
@cite{veltman-1996}, Proposition 3.6(iv).
When an ordering respects φ, its restriction to φ-worlds is the same as the full ordering: refinement is idempotent on respected defaults.
Idempotency: refining by φ twice is the same as refining once.
@cite{veltman-1996}, Proposition 3.6(ii): (ε ∘ e) ∘ e = ε ∘ e.
Commutativity: the order of refinements doesn't matter.
Follows from refinement being intersection with a set of pairs: (ε ∘ e₁) ∘ e₂ = ε ∩ R(e₁) ∩ R(e₂) = (ε ∘ e₂) ∘ e₁.
Refining by the universal property is the identity.
Refining by the empty property is the identity (vacuously).
Respecting ordering equality: if an ordering respects φ, then refining by φ gives back the same ordering.
@cite{veltman-1996}: ε ∘ e = ε when e is already a default in ε.
Under a connected ordering that respects φ, all optimal worlds in a domain satisfy φ — provided the domain has at least one φ-world.
This generalizes refine_total_optimal beyond the total ordering.
Connectedness is essential: without it, a non-φ-world can be optimal
by being incomparable with all φ-worlds.
Note: @cite{veltman-1996} Proposition 3.4(i) states this without the connectedness assumption, but his proof implicitly relies on states being reachable from the total ordering, which ensures connectedness after a single refinement. After multiple refinements by "crossing" properties, connectedness can fail and the result no longer holds for arbitrary respecting orderings.
Refinement makes φ-worlds optimal. Starting from the total ordering, refining by φ makes the optimal worlds in any domain d exactly the φ-worlds in d — provided at least one φ-world exists.
This is the mathematical core of Veltman's system: "normally φ" followed by "presumably φ" succeeds, because refinement guarantees φ-worlds become the most normal.
An optimal φ-world under no remains optimal under no.refine φ.
If w is optimal in d (no world in d strictly dominates it) and w satisfies φ, then w is still optimal in d after refinement by φ. This is the core lemma for coherence preservation (Proposition 4.7): refinement can't destroy the optimality of worlds that satisfy the refinement property.
When the ordering respects φ, no non-φ-world can dominate a φ-world. Combined with optimality, this constrains which worlds can be optimal.
Construct a normality ordering from a list of propositions. w ≤ v iff every proposition satisfied by v is also satisfied by w.
This is @cite{kratzer-1981}'s ordering source construction: {p ∈ A : v ∈ p} ⊆ {p ∈ A : w ∈ p}.
Equivalent to atLeastAsGoodAs in Modality/Kratzer.lean (computable)
and kratzerPlausibility in BeliefRevision.lean (with smoothness).
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Refining from the total ordering always gives a connected ordering.
In the total ordering, every pair is related in both directions.
After one refinement by φ, the ordering (φ v → φ w) is still
connected because material implication between truth values always
holds in at least one direction.
This does NOT generalize to arbitrary connected orderings: if only
w ≤ v holds (not v ≤ w) and φ(v), ¬φ(w), neither refined
direction holds. And after two refinements by "crossing" properties,
connectedness can fail entirely.
@cite{darwiche-pearl-1997}, Definition 8. Conditions on how a total pre-order (faithful assignment) may change under revision by μ. These are the representation-theorem equivalents of the iterated revision postulates C1–C4. They constrain how any ordering-based semantics — Kratzer modals, Lewis conditionals, Veltman defaults — should evolve under discourse update.
`prior` and `post` are the orderings before and after revision by μ.
Lower in the ordering = more normal/plausible.
CR1: The ordering among μ-worlds is preserved.
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CR2: The ordering among ¬μ-worlds is preserved.
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CR3: If a μ-world was strictly below a ¬μ-world, it stays strictly below.
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CR4: If a μ-world was ≤ a ¬μ-world, it stays ≤.