Common Nouns as Predicates vs. Types @cite{sutton-2024} #
@cite{chatzikyriakidis-luo-2020} @cite{cooper-2023} @cite{luo-2012}
Montague's STT treats common nouns as predicates: man : Entity → Bool.
TTR treats them as types: Man : Type, where a : Man witnesses that
a is a man. @cite{sutton-2024} §§3–5 argues these are not notational variants
— the choice determines whether selectional restriction violations are
type errors or merely false.
This file proves the equivalence where both approaches agree, and the separation where they diverge.
The bridge #
Given a Montague predicate p : E → Bool, the corresponding TTR ptype
is λ e => PLift (p e = true) — inhabited exactly when the predicate
holds. The bridge theorem montague_ttr_equiv proves these give the
same truth conditions for basic predication.
The separation #
Selectional restrictions: In TTR, "the chair laughed" fails to compose (no witness of
Animateforchair). In Montague, it composes fine and evaluates tofalse. The TTR approach makes category mistakes distinguishable from contingent falsity.Hyperintensionality: Co-extensional Montague predicates are equal functions (
funext). Co-extensional TTR ptypes can be distinct (differentITypenames). TTR preserves the groundhog/woodchuck distinction; Montague collapses it.
Lift a Montague predicate E → Bool to a TTR ptype E → Type.
The resulting type family is inhabited at e iff p e = true.
Equations
Instances For
Inhabitation of predToPtype p e is decidable (since p e = true is).
Project a TTR ptype back to a Montague predicate. Requires decidable inhabitation (satisfied by any finite ptype).
Equations
- Comparisons.CNsAsTypes.ptypeToPred P e = decide (Nonempty (P e))
Instances For
Bridge theorem: Montague predication and TTR type inhabitation
agree when connected by predToPtype.
p e = true ↔ Nonempty (predToPtype p e) — the predicate holds of e
iff the corresponding ptype is inhabited (has a witness).
The round-trip ptypeToPred ∘ predToPtype recovers the original predicate.
TTR propExtension coincides with our bridge on lifted predicates.
In Montague's STT, every entity has the same type e. A verb like
"laugh" takes any entity and returns true or false. There is no
structural distinction between a category mistake ("the chair laughed")
and contingent falsity ("Mary didn't laugh").
In TTR/MTT, verbs can require arguments of specific types. "Laugh"
takes Animate, not Entity. A chair is not Animate, so the
predication doesn't compose — it's not false, it's ill-typed.
@cite{sutton-2024} §4: "In MTT [...] common nouns are interpreted as types [...] selectional restrictions are type requirements."
Ontological sorts (TTR types for entity subclasses).
Instances For
Instances For
In Montague, everything is an Entity. Chairs and people cohabit.
- john : FlatEntity
- mary : FlatEntity
- chair : FlatEntity
- rock : FlatEntity
Instances For
Montague predicate: laughs is defined on ALL entities.
Equations
- Comparisons.CNsAsTypes.laughs_montague Comparisons.CNsAsTypes.FlatEntity.john = true
- Comparisons.CNsAsTypes.laughs_montague Comparisons.CNsAsTypes.FlatEntity.mary = false
- Comparisons.CNsAsTypes.laughs_montague Comparisons.CNsAsTypes.FlatEntity.chair = false
- Comparisons.CNsAsTypes.laughs_montague Comparisons.CNsAsTypes.FlatEntity.rock = false
Instances For
In Montague, "the chair laughed" composes and evaluates to false.
It's the same kind of thing as "Mary didn't laugh" — both are false.
There's no structural way to distinguish category mistakes from
contingent falsity — both are just false.
TTR predicate: laughs is typed to require Animate arguments.
"The chair laughed" doesn't evaluate to false — it doesn't typecheck.
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Instances For
In TTR, contingent falsity (Mary doesn't laugh) is well-typed but false.
Category mistakes (chair laughs) don't typecheck at all. The selectional
restriction prevents composition, rather than evaluating to false.
Montague predicates are functions E → Bool. Two predicates with
the same extension are definitionally equal by funext. TTR types
carry intensional identity — two types can have the same witnesses
yet remain distinct.
@cite{sutton-2024} §3.1: "there is nothing which prevents two types from being associated with exactly the same set of objects."
The consequence for attitude reports: Montague cannot distinguish "John believes a groundhog is outside" from "John believes a woodchuck is outside" — the belief content is the same function. TTR can.
TTR preserves the distinction: groundhog ≠ woodchuck as ITypes, even when co-extensional. Attitude verbs can be sensitive to this.
For basic extensional predication over a fixed domain without
selectional restrictions or attitude contexts, Montague predicates
and TTR ptypes are interchangeable. The bridge is predToPtype/
ptypeToPred, and the equivalence is montague_ttr_equiv.
The approaches diverge exactly when:
- Selectional restrictions matter (§2)
- Hyperintensional contexts arise (§3)
- Copredication requires dot types (see TypeTheoretic/Copredication.lean)
These are precisely @cite{sutton-2024}'s arguments for rich type theories.
Summary: the predicate/type duality is an equivalence modulo three phenomena. We can state the exact boundary.